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Agricultural research and development (R&D) investment is becoming an increasingly im-
portant policy issue as food prices push upwards and food security problems emerge. An im-
portant source of agricultural R&D funding is from producer check-offs, which are increasingly
being used to fund applied agricultural research such as disease management, genetic improve-
ment, and weed control. Existing studies of producer-funded agricultural R&D indicate that
there are high private and social rates of return to agricultural R&D investment by farmers, and
thus that farmers are under investing in R&D.
The focus of this thesis is at the producer level. This study examines one of the factors –
the horizon problem – behind the apparent disincentive for farmers to invest in producer-funded
R&D activities. It has been argued that given the long period of time over which the benefits
of R&D investment occur, the increasing age of the farm population implies that the horizon
problem could be indeed an important factor in producer underinvestment. Contrary to this
widely acknowledged argument, this study shows the horizon problem is likely not a factor
affecting farmers R&D investment decisions.
Two models are developed to examine the horizon problem. The first model consists of a
framework for determining the marginal internal rate of return of investing in R&D. Specifically,
the analysis compares the internal rate of return IRRh associated with the farmers’ planning
horizon with the internal rate of return IRR associated with the benefit horizon of the R&D. The
impact of the horizon problem is determined by examining the difference between IRRh and
IRR. In this analysis the farmers are assumed to be located in a small country – i.e., a country
whose collective output has no impact on world price – and produce a single product.
The results of the horizon problem model show how that, contrary to what some authors have
argued, the horizon problem is likely not a disincentive for R&D investment, unless the time
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horizon of farmers is very short. Given that the membership horizon for the average Canadian
producer is 15 to 20 years, it is expected that the horizon problem is not an issue for Canadian
producers. Furthermore, the analysis assumes farmers only are concerned with profit maximiza-
tion. However, farmers may also consider other factors when making R&D investment decisions,
such as future generations of agricultural producers and environment issues. The results of this
study show that, even under the assumption of profit maximization, the horizon problem is not
an issue for Canadian farmers, let alone in a more realistic model implemented by including
factors other than profit. The results of the horizon problem model also show that the impact of
the horizon problem is not affected by land tenure relationships.
In the second model, the assumption of a single-product small-country exporter is relaxed.
The model consists of a multi-region, multi-product trade model that is used to examine the impact
of Canadian pea R&D funding on consumers and producers in Canada and in various countries
around the world that produce and consume pulses. To address the underinvestment issue, it is
important to understand the question of who benefits from the research that is undertaken, and
who bears the cost. Given that Canada is the largest pea exporter in the world an increase in
R&D investment can be expected to have a significant impact on international trade and overseas
producers and consumers. Given this impact, there is a need to develop a model of a large-country
exporter. In addition, since R&D in the pulse industry affects the profitability of growing other
crops such as canola and wheat, it is necessary to consider the multi-product case.
The model considers the lags that occur between R&D investment and increases in the re-
search benefits. It explicitly specifies the linkage among the check-off ratio, the R&D investment,
and the knowledge stock. This dynamic framework allows the calculation of the internal rate of
return to Canadian producer-funded R&D and a re-examination of the horizon problem in the
case of the multi-product large-country exporter. The model also fills a gap in our understanding
of the manner in which the nature of the supply shifts affects R&D returns. This study examines
the empirically relevant case where a pivotal supply shift generates the R&D cost and a parallel
supply shift generates the R&D benefits. Contrary to what some authors find, the incentives to
invest are not the same in the large country exporter case and in the small country exporter case,
a situation that is particularly important for the Canadian pulse industry.
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The simulation results from the second model illustrate that with increased pea R&D invest-
ment, Canadian producers, as well as consumers in all regions, are better off as a result of the
R&D investment, while overseas producers are worse off.
The results of the sensitivity analysis indicate that the IRR to Canadian producers depends
critically on how large an impact pea R&D has on the production of other crops (e.g., wheat
and canola). The larger is this impact – i.e., the more that wheat and canola production falls
as a result of higher yields/lower costs of pea production – the smaller is the IRR. The results
also indicate that the elasticities of demand for peas and lentils in the importing countries do not
have an impact on the IRR in the case where Canada is a large country exporter for peas only;
however, they do have an impact on IRR in the case where Canada is a large exporter for both
peas and lentils. In all cases, the more elastic is the demand, the higher is the IRR.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to sincerely express my deep gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Murray Fulton, Professor,
Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy, for his guidance and inspiration throughout
the preparation of my thesis. The valuable experience of working with him will generate a
profound impact on my career as an economist.
I also want to express my sincere appreciation to my thesis committee members. I am grateful
to Dr. Richard Gray, Professor, Department of Bioresource Policy, Business and Economics, Dr.
Haizhen Mou, Assistant Professor, Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy, and
Dr. Viktoriya Galushko, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Regina.
Their valuable comments and suggestions improved my thesis significantly. I would like to
thank Professor Scott Jeffrey, Department of Resource Economics and Environmental Sociology,
University of Alberta, for serving as my external examiner.
I would also like to thank other individuals who helped me in many different ways. I would
like to thank Professor Bill Brown and his wife Charlene Brown – my Canadian family – for
their support and encouragement throughout my stay in Saskatchewan. I also thank Dr. Changbai
Xiu, Dr. Bernie Sonntag, Dr. Kurt Klein, and Dr. Eric Howe for their long-lasting friendship and
their encouragement throughout my Ph.D program.
My appreciation also goes to all the faculty, staff and students in the Department of Biore-
source Policy, Business and Economics for the warm-hearted help I have received from them.
Finally, my deepest gratefulness goes to my parents, Xiangtian Xiao and Suzhen Xue, for
their life-long love and unconditional support. Their love provides me the inspiration to chase
my dream and be a better myself every day.
Financial support for this thesis was provided by a Ph.D. scholarship from the Government
of Saskatchewan through the Alliance for Food and Bioproducts Innovation (AFBI) research
project “Innovation and Producer Decision Making: Why Farmers Appear to Underinvest in
Agricultural R&D.” Without this financial support this research would not have been possible.
v
Contents
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Contributions of The Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Organization of The Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 An Overview of Pulse Industry 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 World Pulse Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 Pulse Industry in Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5 Administration of Canadian Pulse Check-Offs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.1 Producer Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.2 Check-Off Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5.3 Administration of R&D Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3 The Horizon Problem 28
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
vi
CONTENTS CONTENTS
3.2 Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.4 A Framework for Analyzing the Horizon Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5 The Theoretical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5.1 Stage 2 – Determination of the Optimal Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.5.2 Stage 1 – Determination of the Optimal Levy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.5.3 Calculation of the Marginal Rate of Return . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.6 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.6.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.6.2 Results and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.7 Monte Carlo Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.8 Impact of Land Tenure on The Horizon Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.9 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.10Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4 A Model of The World Pulse Market 63
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2 Derivation of Demand Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3 Derivation of Supply Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4 Derivation of Economic Surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.4.1 Consumer Surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.4.2 Producer Surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.5 The Partial Equilibrium Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.6 The Dynamic Partial Equilibrium Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.7 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5 The Returns of Canadian Producer-Funded R&D 75
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.2 Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.3 A Framework for The Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
vii
CONTENTS CONTENTS
5.4 Simulation of The Effects of Canadian Producer-Funded R&D . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.4.1 The Simulation Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.4.2 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.4.3 Specification of Key Parameters and Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.4.4 Results and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.5 Comparison of Current Results with Traditional Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.6.1 Effects of Cross Knowledge Elasticities on Canadian Producer IRR . . . . 104
5.6.2 Effects of Cross Demand Elasticities on Canadian Producer IRR . . . . . . 105
5.6.3 Effects of Demand Elasticities on Canadian Producer IRR . . . . . . . . . 105
5.7 Re-examine the Horizon Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.7.1 Effects of Trade Status on the Horizon Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.7.2 Effects of Cross Knowledge Elasticities on the Horizon Problem . . . . . . 108
5.8 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6 Summary and Conclusions 112
6.1 Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.2 Implications for Further Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Bibliography 116
Appendix A Technical Notes of Chapter 5 122
A.1 Demand and Supply Functions for Each Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A.1.1 Demand Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A.1.2 Supply Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
A.2 Derivation of Indirect Utility Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
A.2.1 Importing Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
A.2.2 Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
A.3 Derivation of Consumer Surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
A.3.1 Importing Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
A.3.2 Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
viii
CONTENTS CONTENTS
A.4 The Partial Equilibrium Trade Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
A.4.1 Partial Equilibrium Model before the Increase of Pea R&D Investment . . . 146
A.4.2 Partial Equilibrium Model after the Increase of Pea R&D Investment . . . . 148
A.5 Proof of The Proportional R&D Benefits and Costs: Parallel Supply Shift vs Pivotal
Supply Shift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
ix
List of Tables
1.1 Worldwide Growth in Agricultural Land and Labor Productivity, 1961-2005 . . . 2
1.2 Average Annual Growth Rates of Public Agricultural R&D Spending . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Public and Private Agricultural R&D Spending in Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Regional Production and Utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Production Share, Export/Import Share in the World Market . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 General Types of Producer Organizations in Saskatchewan . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Comparison of Pulse Check-off Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1 Benefit-Cost Ratio and IRR for Canadian Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 IRRh with Different Values of η and λ: g = 5, T=10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 Mean and Variance of the Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4 Land Tenure and the Horizon Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.1 Initial Values of Prices, Quantities, and Knowledge Stock in The Model . . . . . 86
5.2 Transportation Costs and Exchange Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.3 Model’s Parameters and Their Baseline Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.4 Dynamic Change of the Check-off Ratio, R&D Investment, and Knowledge Stock 90
5.5 Effects on Prices and Production of Canadian Pea Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.6 IRR for Single-Product and Multi-Product Models: Parallel vs Pivotal Supply Shift 102
5.7 Base and Alternative Values of Parameters Used in Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . 104
5.8 Sensitivity Analysis for Selected Parameter Values: IRR to Canadian Producers . 106
5.9 Effects of Trade Status on the Horizon Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
x
LIST OF TABLES LIST OF TABLES
5.10Effects of Cross Knowledge Elasticities on the Horizon Problem . . . . . . . . . 111
xi
List of Figures
2.1 World Exports of Pulses, 2006 – 2010 Average . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 World Market Share for Canadian Pulse Crops and SPG R&D Investment . . . . 13
2.3 Crop Harvested Acreage in Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Crop Revenue Share in Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Canadian Pulse Crop Yield and SPG R&D Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6 Canadian Pulse Production and SPG R&D Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.7 Production Share for Canadian Pulse Crops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.8 Import Share for Canadian Pulses, 2008 – 2012 Average . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.9 Organizational Structure of Saskatchewan Producer Organizations . . . . . . . . 23
2.10SPG Expenditure Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.11Innovation Flow for Saskatchewan Pulse Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1 The Horizon Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 The Pattern of The Change in Check-Off Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3 A Conceptual Model of the Horizon Problem: Marginal Cumulative Benefits versus
Marginal Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.4 Gamma Distribution of The Lag Weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.5 Empirical Result of The Horizon IRR for IRR = 0.25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.6 Empirical Result of The Horizon IRR for IRR = 0.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.7 Empirical Result of The Horizon IRR for IRR = 0.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.8 Empirical Result of The Horizon IRR for IRR = 0.15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.9 Probability Density Functions for IRRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
xii
LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF FIGURES
3.10Calculated Values of Aˆ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.1 Changes in Knowledge Stock and Check-Off Ratio for The Dynamic PEM . . . . 78
5.2 Research Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.3 Impact of Canadian Pea Innovation on Global Pea Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.4 Lag Weight Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.5 Lag Weights, Knowledge Stock and ∆PS of Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.6 Effects on Pulse Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.7 Effects on Canadian Wheat and Canola Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.8 Effects on Pulse Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.9 Effects on Economic Surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.10Ranking of Welfare Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.11Sensitivity Analysis of Trade Status on the Horizon Problem . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.12Sensitivity Analysis of Cross Knowledge Elasticities on Canadian ∆PS (Large-
country Exporter) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109






The recent increase in food prices raises important issues around the long term demand and
supply of agricultural commodities. The worldwide demand for agricultural commodities has
dramatically increased, driven by population expansion, per capita income growth, and the
demand for biofuels.
The world population has more than doubled from around 3 billion in 1961 to 6.89 billion
in 2010, and is projected to reach 9.49 billion in 2050 [Bremner et al., 2010]. This increase in
population will cause a substantial growth in food demand, even without an increase in income.
Increased incomes in the developing world are expected to significantly increase the per capita
demand for foods such as meat, dairy products, fruits, and vegetable oils. Third, the newly
emerged demand for biofuels, which is equivalent to a decade of worldwide grain production
increase, further adds to the demand for agricultural products.
Future demand projections for agricultural commodities indicate that, even without biofuels,
food supply must increase 70 percent by 2050 [Bremner et al., 2010]. However, agricultural
production faces serious constraints of limited arable land and water. To meet the upcoming
demand under these physical limitations, increases in the food supply have to be mainly driven
by productivity growth [Alston et al., 2009a]. Therefore, productivity growth will be the pivotal
determinant of the long term food supply.
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However, productivity growth has slowed significantly around the world since 1990. As Table
1.1 shows, global land and labor productivity has been growing at a substantially slower pace
in 1990-2005 than during the period 1961-1990. Land productivity is much lower in the period
1990-2005 than in the period 1961-1990 (1.19 percent per year versus 1.90 percent per year).
Global labor productivity also slowed over the 1990-2005 time frame compared to the 1961-
1990 period (0.42 percent per year versus 1.21 percent per year). If the slowdown in productivity
growth continues, it is expected to put significant upward pressure on future food prices.
Table 1.1: Worldwide Growth in Agricultural Land and Labor Productivity, 1961-2005
Land Productivity Labor Productivity
Group 1961-90 1990-05 1961-90 1990-05
percentage
World 2.03 1.82 1.12 1.36
Excl. China 1.90 1.19 1.21 0.42
Top 20 Producers 2.11 2.16 1.17 1.77
Excl. China 1.98 1.38 1.33 0.63
Source: Alston et al. [2009b].
Many factors have caused the slowdown in productivity growth. These factors include in-
creased land degradation, continuing disease and insect infestations, frequent extreme climate
events such as drought and flooding, and farmers’ slow adoption of research outcomes [Alston
et al., 2009a].
Reduced productivity growth is also the result of a decreasing growth rate of agricultural re-
search and development (R&D) investment [Alston et al., 2009a]. R&D investment is undertaken
by three key groups – government, the private sector, and agricultural producers. The rate of
increase in public research funding in many countries has slowed considerably since the 1970s.
Table 1.2 shows, the global average annual rates of growth in public agricultural R&D spending
decreased from 2.02 percent in the 1980s to 1.72 percent in the 1990s. Although the overall
growth rate in developing countries was faster in the 1990s than in the 1980s (3.31 percent vs
2.21 percent), OECD countries recorded a significant slower growth rate in the 1990s than in
the 1980s (0.38 percent vs 1.89 percent).
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Table 1.2: Average Annual Growth Rates of Public Agricultural R&D Spending
1980s 1990s
percentage
World Total 2.02 1.72
Total OECD 1.89 0.38
United States 2.36 2.01
Canada -0.15 -0.80
Total Developing 2.21 3.31
China 4.81 6.67
India 6.16 6.95
Source: Alston et al. [2010] p145.
Table 1.2 also indicates that Canadian public agricultural R&D funding is falling. Its annual
growth rate was not only substantially lower than the OECD as a whole, but it has been negative
for the past 30 years – the growth rate decreased from -0.15 percent per year in the 1980s to
-0.80 percent per year in the 1990s. The result is that total real Canadian public spending in
agricultural R&D declined from 520.7 million dollars in 1981 to 474.3 million dollars in 2000
(Table 1.3). This lower R&D investment, as Veeman and Gray [2010] concluded, has made a
significant contribution to the slowdown of productivity growth of Canadian agriculture in the
past 10 to 15 years. Consequently, Canadian agriculture has become less productive and less
competitive relative to other regions such as China and Latin America.
In contrast to the reduced public funding, real private sector investment has dramatically
increased in Canada since 1981. Table 1.3 shows that private sector funding in Canada increased
from 109.2 million dollars in 1981 to 244.5 million dollars in 2000. This increase, combined
with less public R&D, has resulted in the private sector share of agricultural R&D spending
increasing from 17 percent in 1981 to 39 percent in 2007.
The third important source of agricultural R&D funding is from producer check-offs, which
are increasingly being used to fund applied agricultural research such as disease management,
genetic improvement, and weed control. It is argued that the producer check-off is a desirable
way to fund agricultural R&D for two reasons: (1) producers, as the main beneficiaries, should
bear the R&D costs rather than the general taxpayers; and (2) it is more efficient than general
taxes.
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Table 1.3: Public and Private Agricultural R&D Spending in Canada
Private
Public Private Share
Year Spending Spending Total
Millions of international dollars percentage
(2000 prices)
1981 520.7 109.2 17
2000 474.3 244.5 34
2007 391
Source: Alston et al. [2010];
1Gray and Weseen [2008].
First, farmers are the primary beneficiaries of agricultural R&D in Canada. Previous research,
which is summarized by Brinkman [2004], shows that for internationally traded commodities,
Canadian producers receive 85 to 96 percent of the benefit from public research. The reason for
this large percentage is that Canada is typically a price taker on international markets. Hence
productivity improvements simply lower the cost of production without lowering the price, thus
providing the benefits to producers. Based on the philosophy that those who benefit should pay,
farmers should undertake the R&D investment.
The second reason that farmers should fund R&D is that producer funding avoids some of
the efficiency losses compared to public funding. Levying farmers directly, rather than taxing
the general taxpayers, costs the society less for raising the same amount of R&D funding. As
Alston et al. [2003] argued, in the absence of other market distortions, the marginal social cost
of check-off revenue is less than the marginal social cost of general tax revenue.
Among hundreds of existing studies of agricultural R&D, only a few have been done on
producer-funded R&D. This research falls into two general categories. One category discusses
distribution issues, while the other provides estimates of the rate of return to producer-funded
agricultural R&D.
In the first category, Alston et al. [2003] argue that the distribution of benefits and costs of
levy-funded R&D is determined by the magnitude and the nature (parallel or pivotal) of the
supply shift. Alston et al. [2004] formally model the producers’ optimal check-off ratio versus
the optimal check-off ratio for society as a whole and theoretically determine the distribution
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of benefits and costs of producer-funded R&D. Zhao [2003] discusses the welfare distribution
of levy-funded R&D combined with government funding for the Australian grape and wine
industry. She concludes that grape producers, wine makers and overseas consumers receive a
larger share of R&D benefits relative to their costs; the government and the domestic parties
(domestic consumers and mobile factor providers and marketers) have costs that are greater than
their corresponding benefits.
In the second category, researchers have estimated the rates of return to producer-funded
R&D [Gray and Weseen, 2008; Gray et al., 2008; Scott et al., 2005; Thirtle, 1999]. For instance,
Scott et al. [2005] estimate the benefit/cost ratio (B/C) for the Western Canadian Wheat producer
check-off to be 4.4 to 1 (every one dollar check-off investment in R&D generates 4.4 dollars in
increased producer surplus) and 12.4 to 1 for barley grower check-offs. Gray et al. [2008] show
that the benefit/cost ratio for the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers (SPG) is 15.8 to 1, the internal
rate of return (IRR) is 39.0 percent from 1984 to 2012; the benefit/cost ratio is 20.2 to 1 and the
IRR is 39.5 per cent over the period 1984 to 2024.
Existing studies of producer-funded agricultural R&D indicate that there are high private
and social rates of return to agricultural R&D investment by farmers, and thus that farmers are
under investing in R&D. Faced with such high rates of return, rational farmers should invest
more, according to standard economic theory, which will bring down the research returns. The
persistent high rates of return imply farmers have not made these additional investments.
A critical question for producer-funded R&D is “Why do farmers not invest more money in
agricultural R&D?” Are there any other factors that could affect farmers’ decisions which are
missing in the existing explanations? How do farmers really make their investment decisions?
These are important questions and to answer them it is necessary to understand the factors that
may affect farmers’ decision making process when it comes to R&D investment.
There are a number of explanations as to why farmer organizations would underinvest in
R&D. These problems include the free-rider problem, the portfolio problem, the control problem,
the heterogeneity problem, and the horizon problem [Olson, 1971; Jensen and Meckling, 1979;
Cook, 1995; Alston and Fulton, 2012; Vitaliano, 1983]. These problems emerge because of the
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individual incentives facing producers in a collective organization and because of the manner in
which decisions are made within the organization.
• The Free-Rider Problem
The public good nature of agricultural R&D means there is a free rider problem – each
member in the group can obtain the benefits of the R&D without making the investment, thus
reducing the incentive to invest. This lack of incentive to invest – effectively a prisoners’ dilemma
– leads to insufficient R&D funding and the lack of the resulting benefits (see [Olson, 1971] for
an in-depth examination of the free-rider problem).
• The Portfolio Problem
The portfolio problem [Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Cook, 1995; Vitaliano, 1983] emerges
when individuals in a group are forced to contribute to a collective investment, which in turn limits
the individual’s ability to diversify their assets. Collective investments, such as group check-offs
and the subsequent investment in R&D, can be seen as part of a farmers’ investment portfolio.
Although more investment in the collective investment would increase returns, farmers would
not wish to make this investment if doing so adversely affected their diversification opportunities.
• The Control Problem
The control problem – or principal-agent problem – arises when the members of a commodity
group, through their board of directors (the principal), are unable to perfectly monitor the actions
of the group’s manager (the agent) [Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Cook, 1995]. Although the
members might like to see additional R&D undertaken, doing so might not be in the interests of
the manager, who might find this additional R&D to be too time consuming or overly risky. If
this is the case, then underinvestment might be the outcome.
• The Heterogeneity Problem
The heterogeneity problem recognizes that the benefit of R&D is not the same across all
producers, even though all producers pay the same levy. In such a situation, the identity of the
member that effectively makes the R&D investment decision is critical. If decisions are made
on the basis of majority rule and the median producer is someone that finds the R&D benefits
to be particularly small (e.g., because of a skewed distribution of the productivity gains across
producers), then the resulting decision is one that would result in underinvestment. Requirements
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for supermajorities (e.g., in order to satisfy political demands for substantial agreement) will
further exacerbate the problem [Alston and Fulton, 2012].
• Proportionate Distribution of Benefits and Costs
This problem is similar to the heterogeneity problem in that it involves different groups
receiving disproportionate benefits relative to the costs that they incur. In this case the groups are
the different agents in the supply chain. For instance, farmers will not gain proportionately to their
costs – their share of the benefits is less than their share of the costs – if R&D results in a rotation
of the industry supply curve and the demand curve is downward sloping. In such instances, the
optimal amount of R&D funding from the perspective of producers can be expected to be less
than the social optimum [Alston et al., 2004]. This result occurs because the non-proportionate
allocation of costs and benefits directly influences producers’ R&D incentives. As well, a non-
proportionate allocation of costs and benefits may not be perceived as being fair, thus further
affecting R&D decisions.
• The Horizon Problem
The horizon problem is also believed to be an important explanation for underinvestment by
members in a group. As Jensen and Meckling [1979]; Cook [1995] and Vitaliano [1983] argue,
the horizon problem occurs when people’s individual time horizon of staying in the group (their
planning horizon) is shorter than the expected payback time of the investment. Since agricultural
R&D is a long-term investment, the horizon problem may have particular importance for R&D
investment decisions. Cook [1995] (p.1157) argues that for cooperatives “the severity of the
horizon problem intensifies when considering investment in research and development, adver-
tisement, and other intangible assets.” Featherstone and Goodwin [1993] empirically conclude
that older farmers in the United States have a lower level of investment in conservation technolo-
gies. In contrast, Fulton and Giannakas [2012] argue that in cooperatives, the horizon problem
is less severe than believed because of a different objective function (cooperative members are
interested in consumer surplus plus profit, while investor-owned firms are interested only in
profits). Olesen [2007] claims that the horizon problem is likely to cause over-investment rather
than underinvestment, while Fahlbeck [2007] finds no empirical support for the horizon problem
in Swedish agricultural co-operatives.
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1.2 Research Objectives
The objective of this thesis is to examine the impact of one of the above problems, namely the
horizon problem, on the rate of return to agricultural R&D undertaken by producer organizations,
and hence on the incentive for farmers to undertake R&D. The specific question that will be
examined is the impact of the horizon problem on the internal rate of return of agricultural R&D.
Among the factors listed above that are expected to affect investment decisions, a number
of them – specifically the free-rider problem, the control problem, the heterogeneity problem
and the proportionality issue – are concerned about the manner in which individual members
interact in a group/organization or the rules by which decisions are made. The other two – the
portfolio problem and the horizon problem – require an in-depth understanding of the goals and
objectives of the individual member. Since this understanding of the goals and objectives of the
individual member is required before the other issues can be examined, it seems appropriate to
begin with an analysis of them.
The choice of the horizon problem was made because there is evidence that this problem
might be empirically relevant. The average age of farmers has been increasing – it is now 54
years. Given that the benefits to agricultural R&D can take a considerable time to occur – as
Alston et al. [2010] argue, the maximum benefits often do not occur until 25 years after the
investment is made – there is a priori expectation that the horizon problem may be influential
in determining farmers’ R&D decisions.
The analysis of the horizon problem is conducted in two parts. In the first part, the analysis
compares the internal rate of return IRRh associated with the farmers’ planning horizon with
the internal rate of return IRR associated with the benefit horizon of the R&D. The impact of
the horizon problem is determined by examining the difference between IRRh and IRR. In this
analysis the farmers are assumed to be located in a small country – i.e., a country whose collective
output has no impact on world price – and produce a single product. An important part of the
analysis in this section is an examination of the role of land tenure relationships on the internal
rate of return and hence on the horizon problem.
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In the second part of the analysis, the assumption of a single-product small-country exporter
is relaxed and a model for a multi-product large-country exporter is developed. To undertake the
IRR analysis, it is necessary to choose a particular crop, since the impact of R&D investment
depends on the characteristics of the crop in question (e.g., degree of export exposure, importance
in the world market, elasticities of demand and supply). Pulse crops were selected for the analysis
because they are major crops in western Canada. Canada is the largest exporter of pulses in
the world. As a consequence, the added production from agricultural R&D investment will
necessarily affect the world price and thus the welfare of both domestic and foreign consumers
and producers. Given this impact, there is a need to develop a model of a large-country exporter.
In addition, since R&D in the pulse industry affects the profitability of growing other crops such
as canola and wheat, it is necessary to consider the multi-product case.
The analysis empirically examines how the R&D benefits and costs generated by Canadian
producer-funded R&D are distributed between overseas producers and consumers and domestic
producers and consumers. The model considers the lags that occur between R&D investment
and increases in the research benefits. This dynamic framework allows the calculation of the
internal rate of return to Canadian producer-funded R&D and a re-examination of the horizon
problem in the case of the multi-product large-country exporter.
1.3 Contributions of The Thesis
The thesis makes three contributions to the literature. First, contrary to the view that the horizon
problem may be an important disincentive for investment, this study shows that the horizon
problem is unlikely to be the reason for the underinvestment of producer-funded R&D, unless
farmers’ time horizon is very short (e.g., under 10 years). Given that the membership horizon
for the average Canadian producer is 15 to 20 years, the horizon problem is thus likely not an
issue for Canadian producers.
The second contribution involves filling a gap in our understanding of the manner in which
the nature of the supply shifts affects R&D returns. The literature to date (e.g., see Alston et al.
[2004]), assumes that both R&D costs and benefits are generated by the same type of supply
shift, i.e., both shift in a parallel manner or both shift in a pivotal manner. This study examines
9
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the empirically relevant case where a pivotal supply shift generates the R&D cost and a parallel
supply shift generates the R&D benefits. Contrary to what Alston et al. [2004] find, the incentives
to invest are not the same in the large country exporter case and in the small country exporter
case, a situation that is particularly important for the Canadian pulse industry.
The third contribution of the thesis is that it introduces a dynamic pattern of lagged R&D
benefits over a number of periods into a partial equilibrium model. The thesis explicitly specifies
the linkage among the check-off ratio, the R&D investment, and knowledge stock.
1.4 Organization of The Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Since a significant portion of the analysis in the
thesis focuses on the pulse market, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the world pulse industry
and the Canadian pulse check-off mechanism. Chapter 3 develops a theoretical model that can
be used to examine the severity and the existence of the horizon problem, and then empirically
calibrates this model to examine the extent of the horizon problem. Chapter 4 derives a partial
equilibrium model (PEM) to measure the interaction between the peas, lentils, wheat, and canola
markets in Canada and in major pulse import and export countries. Chapter 5 uses the PEM to
empirically examine the global impact of the Canadian pea R&D activity. The thesis concludes
in Chapter 6 with a summary of the key findings, policy implications, and a discussion of the
areas for further exploration.
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Chapter 2
An Overview of Pulse Industry
2.1 Introduction
The growing worldwide demand for agricultural commodities, driven by population expansion,
per capita income growth, and the demand for biofuels, raises concerns around food security.
The major challenge for food and agricultural sector is to provide enough food in both quantity
and quality to meet nutritional needs [FAO, 2013].
Pulse products – crops such as peas, lentils and beans – have the potential to assist in
meeting these food consumption demands. Pulses provide a wide variety of health benefits such
as high fibre, protein, and iron. They are low in fat and sodium, are free of saturated fats and are
cholesterol free [SPG, 2009]. On the supply side, pulses are environmentally friendly because
they take less inputs (such as fertilizer) than other crops and they produce less greenhouse gases
[SPG, 2009]. Pulse crops can fix nitrogen and they can break the disease cycle to improve
land quality and protect water resources. In large part because of these advantages, pulses have
become an important component in crop rotations in countries such as Canada.
2.2 Research Objectives
The objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of the pulse industry in Canada and the
world. The chapter starts with an introduction of the world pulse industry in which Canada is
the largest pulse exporter. The study then moves to a review of the supply and demand sides
of the Canadian pulse industry. Section 2.5 examines the administration of the Canadian pulse
check-off system and the mechanism of R&D investment decision making.
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2.3 World Pulse Industry
World pulse products consist of four major crops: dry peas, lentils, dry beans, and chickpeas.
Pulse products are increasingly traded in the world market, with more than ten million tonnes of
pulses traded annually since 2005 (FAOSTAT). As it will be shown below, Canada is the largest
exporter of pulse products. Since dry peas and lentils are particularly important in Canada, the
focus of the thesis and this chapter is on these two crops.
As panel (a) in Figure 2.1 shows, the major dry pea exporters are Canada, the United States,
France, EU, and Australia. On average, over the period 2006 to 2010, Canada exported 59 percent
of the dry peas traded internationally, compared to 12 percent for the United States, 8 percent
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Figure 2.1: World Exports of Pulses, 2006 – 2010 Average
Source: FAOSTAT.
The major exporting countries in the world lentil market are Canada, the United States,
Turkey, and Australia (see panel (b) in Figure 2.1). Canadian lentils occupied 58 percent of the
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Figure 2.2: World Market Share for Canadian Pulse Crops and SPG R&D Investment
Source: FAOSTAT and Saskatchewan Pulse Growers.
world export market (using the average value of sales over the period 2006 to 2010). The market
shares for the other exporters are 10 percent for the United States, 11 percent for Turkey, 7
percent for Australia, and 15 percent for the rest of the world. Canada is thus the largest exporter
in both the dry pea market and the lentil market.
Canada has not always had such a major presence in the world pulse market. As Figure 2.2
shows, the world market share for Canadian dry peas and lentils was less than 15 percent before
the 1980s. Since 1984, however, Canada’s market share has increased dramatically – specifically,
from 10 percent in 1984 to over 60 percent in 2010. This rise in market share corresponds to the
establishment and development of the SPG over this period.
Figure 2.2 also depicts the pulse R&D investment from producer check-offs. As is illustrated,
a positive relation exists between the SPG R&D investment and the world market share for
Canadian peas and lentils. The reason behind the relationship is the positive feedback effect that
exists between R&D investment and pulse production. With the increase in R&D investment,
the world market share for Canadian pulses increases because of the improved competitiveness
caused by the innovation. The higher pulse production, in turn, results in more R&D investment
13
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and more pulse research. Higher R&D investments generates a higher industry knowledge stock
which in turn drives up pulse production.
2.4 Pulse Industry in Canada
History of Canadian Pulse Production
To understand the development of the pulse industry in Canada, it is necessary to understand the
agricultural policy environment in Western Canada in the 1960s and 1970s. To ensure individual
producers had an equal opportunity to access the export grain market, the Canadian Wheat
Board (CWB) implemented a delivery quota system. In addition to ensuring equal access to
the international market, the quota system regulated wheat production from Western Canada.
Given restrictions on the amount of wheat they could grow, Prairie grain farmers looked for other
opportunities to increase farm income. Among these opportunities were the growing of crops
such as pulses and canola.
Before these new crops could be grown, however, significant R&D was required. Agricultural
R&D activities have played a critical role in the crop development and production improvement
in Canada since the1960s. These research activities led to significant changes in the structure of
crop production. As Figure 2.3 shows, the share for the harvested acreage of canola and pulses
has been increasing while the acreage devoted to wheat has been falling over the last 50 years.
With the increased acreage, farm revenue of canola and pulses also increase, as Figure 2.4 shows.
The increased acreage and farm revenue of both pulses and canola is the result of the extensive
R&D that was undertaken on these crops.
In the canola sector, canola oil was not the major source of edible oil prior to the 1970s due
to its high erucic acid and glucosinolate content, both of which had adverse effects on animals
when fed to them as feed. As a result of R&D efforts, new canola varieties with low erucic
acid content were developed starting in the late 1960s, followed by low glucosinolate in 1974
[Phillips and Khachatourians, 2001]. These variety improvements led to the wide acceptance of
canola meal and oil in the feed and the food system.
The rise of pulse acreage and production was influenced by a variety of technological changes,
including the rise of continuous cropping and direct seeding (and with this a reduction in summer
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Figure 2.4: Crop Revenue Share in Canada
Source: FAOSTAT.
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fallow acreage) [Awada, 2012]. The nitrogen-fixing ability of pulses lowers input costs, and the
inclusion of pulses in a crop rotation improves disease management and weed control. As Figure
2.5 shows, there was an increase in the yield of pulse crops from the late 1970s/early 1980s to the
period since 2005. This increase in yield appears to coincide with the establishment of SPG in
1984 and resulting increase in R&D activity. In addition, the demand for pulses, in both Canada
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Figure 2.5: Canadian Pulse Crop Yield and SPG R&D Investment
Source: FAOSTAT and Saskatchewan Pulse Growers.
The establishment of the Crop Development Centre (CDC), a major research unit funded
by SPG for Canadian pulse crops, in 1971 at the University of Saskatchewan contributed to
new variety development and the commercial acceptance of pulse crops. As Figure 2.6 shows,
pulse production is positively correlated with SPG’s R&D investment. In part because of the
CDC, Saskatchewan has become the major producer of pulses in Canada. In 2012, Saskatchewan
farmers grew 96 percent of Canada’s lentil crops, 90 percent of Canada’s chickpea crops, and
70 percent of Canada’s dry pea crops [SPG, 2013].
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Figure 2.6: Canadian Pulse Production and SPG R&D Investment
Source: FAOSTAT and Saskatchewan Pulse Growers.
Current Canadian Pulse Production
Canadian pulse production consists of four closely related crops: dry peas, lentils, dry beans,
and chickpeas. The crop shares for the different pulse crops are depicted in Figure 2.7. Since
2000, more than 80 percent of Canadian pulse production has been made up of peas and lentils.
In 2011, pea production accounted for over 50 percent and lentils for about 40 percent of pulse
production. The production of dry beans and chickpeas together is less than 10 percent.
Major Consumers of Canadian Pulses
The demand for Canadian peas and lentils in the world market is depicted in Figure 2.8. The
major importers of Canadian dry peas, as panel (a) shows, are India, China, Bangladesh, and the
European Union. Of Canada’s total pea exports, on average from 2008 to 2012, 49 percent were
exported to India, 19 percent to China, 11 percent to Bangladesh, three percent to EU, and 18
percent to the rest of the world (ROW).
The major importing countries for Canadian lentils are, as Figure 2.8 panel (b) shows, Turkey,
India, the Europe Union, and Bangladesh. Specifically, 17 percent of the exported Canadian
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Figure 2.8: Import Share for Canadian Pulses, 2008 – 2012 Average
Source: Statistics Canada, CATSNET Analytics.
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lentils were sold to Turkey, 16 percent to India, 10 percent to the European Union, and 5 percent
to Bangladesh. The remaining 51 percent is spread over more than 100 countries and regions,
with the share for any specific jurisdiction being very small. This remainder is treated as the rest
of the world (ROW).
It is important to note that Turkey is a major importer of Canadian lentils (see Figure 2.8) as
well as a major lentil exporter (see Figure 2.1). This trade pattern is a result of Turkey importing
lentils from Canada and then selling them to neighbouring countries. As Table 2.1 shows, in
2009, Turkey domestic lentil utilization and domestic supply were both just over 300,000 tonnes
– i.e., domestic supply roughly equaled domestic demand. Table 2.1 also shows that Turkey
imported 142,000 tonnes of lentils and exported 130,000 tonnes to other countries.
Based on the above evidence, the trade model that is developed in Chapter 4 and empirically
examined in Chapter 5 focuses on dry peas and lentils in the context of a seven-region model. In
this model, the world is divided into: Canada (c), India (i), China (h), Bangladesh (b), Turkey (t),
the European Union (e), and the ROW (r). With this regional division, the impact of an increase
in Canadian pea R&D investment can be determined on a region-by-region basis.
To construct the spatial trade model, it is necessary to have an overview of the distribution of
production and imports/exports for pulse crops for the seven regions. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 report
the data on the value and the percentage share of production, exports, imports, and domestic
usage for dry peas, lentils, wheat and canola for each region in the model. Among the six major
pulse importing countries, India is the biggest pulse importer. It occupies over 40 percent of
world imports of peas and 17 percent of world imports of lentils in 2009.
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Table 2.1: Regional Production and Utilization
World Canada India China Bangladesh Turkey EU ROW
Thousands of Tonnes
Production
Dry Peas 10,527 3,379 750 960 12 4 1,399 4,023
Lentils 3,906 1,510 953 120 61 302 32 928
Wheat 680,102 26,848 80,686 115,115 849 20,600 138,255 297,755
Canola 62,705 12,626 7,201 3,675 203 114 21,483 17,403
Import
Dry Peas 4,015 50 1,656 394 488 2 514 911
Lentils 1,680 10 288 3.6 178 142 188 871
Wheat 161,365 883 180 2,712 2,415 3,420 44,593 107,162
Canola 18,732 166 0 3,291 172 158 9,851 5,094
Export
Dry Peas 4,272 2,618 1 6 5 0 349 1,298
Lentils 1,807 1,241 0.6 18 0 130 28 390
Wheat 180,625 20,126 146 672 0 3,161 62,454 94,061
Canola 17,006 7,809 35 2 0 0 5,250 3,910
Stock Variation1
Dry Peas 117 0 - 0 - 0 264 -147
Lentils - - - - - - - -
Wheat -26,241 -285 4,880 -5,972 -661 -1,308 547 -13,682
Canola -2,681 -45 - -1,000 - - -1,962 326
Utilization
Dry Peas 10,387 811 2,405 1,349 501 6 1,827 3,489
Lentils 3,779 280 1,241 106 239 314 192 1,409
Wheat 634,602 7,320 75,834 111,183 2,598 19,550 120,941 297,174
Canola 61,751 4,938 7,166 15,963 375 272 24,122 18,913
Source: FAOSTAT 2009.
1The stock carried from the previous year plus the inflow minus the outflow in the current year.
2.5 Administration of Canadian Pulse Check-Offs
2.5.1 Producer Organizations
Under The Agri-Food Act, there are three general types of producer associations: development
boards, development commissions, and marketing boards [Saskatchewan-Government, 2004].
Table 2.3 describes the activities of these three general types. The major mission of the devel-
opment boards and commissions is to promote and develop the production and/or marketing for
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Table 2.2: Production Share, Export/Import Share in the World Market
Canada India China Bangladesh Turkey EU ROW
percentage
Production
Peas 32.1 7.1 9.1 0.1 0.0 13.3 38.2
Lentils 38.7 24.4 3.1 1.5 7.7 0.8 23.7
Wheat 3.9 11.9 16.9 0.1 3.0 20.3 43.8
Canola 20.1 11.5 5.9 0.3 0.2 34.3 27.8
Imports
Peas 1.2 41.2 9.8 12.2 0.0 12.8 22.7
Lentils 0.6 17.1 0.0 10.6 8.4 11.2 51.8
Wheat 0.5 0.1 1.7 1.5 2.1 27.6 66.4
Canola 0.9 0.0 17.6 0.9 0.8 52.6 27.2
Exports
Peas 61.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 8.2 30.4
Lentils 68.7 0.0 1.0 0.0 7.2 1.5 21.6
Wheat 11.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 1.8 34.6 52.1
Canola 45.9 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.9 23.0
Source: FAOSTAT 2009.
a particular agricultural product by collecting a levy from producers that can be used for R&D
and/or market development. The only difference between the development board and the devel-
opment commission is that the former collects mandatory non-refundable check-offs, while the
latter collects a mandatory refundable levy.
According to The Agri-Food Act, “The Agri-Food Council co-ordinates the process of the
regulatory review by incorporating input from the plan proponents and legal and drafting services
by the Ministry of Justice. Plans proposing non-refundable levies and/or compulsory powers can
be established only after a vote of producers. If a producer vote is conducted, at least 60 per
cent of all voting producers in the case of a Development Board plan must vote in favour before
the Lieutenant Governor in Council can proceed to establishment” [Saskatchewan-Government,
2004].
The commodity groups that fall under each of the producer organizations are shown in Figure
2.9. The development board group includes three producer associations that collect mandatory
non-refundable check-offs; one of these is the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers. The development
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Table 2.3: General Types of Producer Organizations in Saskatchewan
Purpose Initiator Duties Director Establishment Check-Off
To promote Producers Collect Elected 60% Mandatory
and develop levy and producers Non-refundable
Development the that appointed vote in
Board production will favour
and/or be used
marketing for R&D
To promote Producers Collect Elected 60% Mandatory
and develop or levy and producers Refundable
Development the Lieutenant that appointed vote in
Commission production Governor will favour or
and/or in be used Discretion
marketing Council for R&D of Cabinet
To promote Producers Compulsory Elected 80% Mandatory
and develop marketing and producers Non-refundable
Marketing the powers appointed vote in
Board production including favour
and/or supply
marketing management
Source: Government of Saskatchewan documents.
commission group contains ten producer organizations that collect mandatory refundable check-
offs. The largest and most important of the commissions is the Saskatchewan Canola Develop-
ment Commission.
In 1976, the Saskatchewan Pulse Crop Growers Association (SPGCA) was formed by a
group of nine pulse growers. In 1983, the pulse growers voted to establish a mandatory, non-
refundable check-off to fund programs to develop the pulse industry and to create worldwide
demand for Saskatchewan pulse crops. In the same year, the Saskatchewan Pulse Crop Develop-
ment Board (SPCDB) was created. This board later became known as the Saskatchewan Pulse
Growers (SPG). Currently, more than 20,000 registered pulse producers are growing pulses
across Saskatchewan.
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Figure 2.9: Organizational Structure of Saskatchewan Producer Organizations
Source: Government of Saskatchewan documents.
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2.5.2 Check-Off Mechanisms
The check-off system of Canadian producer groups can be categorized into two forms. One
is a mandatory refundable check-off, in which farmers have the right to request a refund after
paying the check-off. The other one is a mandatory non-refundable check-off, in which farmers
do not have the right to request a refund. In this latter group, farmers who pay the check-off are
automatically enrolled as registered group members and are given the right to vote for the board
of directors. The board of directors makes decisions about R&D investment.
The Saskatchewan Pulse Growers operates a mandatory non-refundable check-off. The
check-off ratio was set at 0.5 percent at the time the Saskatchewan Pulse Development Board
(SPDB) was established in 1984. In 2001, Pulse Canada Research released a report demonstrat-
ing that there was an underinvestment in R&D for pulse crops and an increased check-off ratio
was needed. To address this underinvestment issue, SPDB proposed to increase the check-off
ratio from 0.5 percent to one percent. After discussions with producers, the decision was made
to increase the check-off ratio by using a two-step approach – the check-off ratio increased from
0.5 percent to 0.75 percent in 2002, and then in 2003 it was increased from 0.75 percent to the
current one percent.
Table 2.4 summarizes the pulse check-off systems in Canada, the United States, and Australia.
The Saskatchewan Pulse Growers, along with Idaho, Washington, and Australia, operate a non-
refundable system. Alberta, Manitoba, and North Dakota have a refundable levy system.
Table 2.4: Comparison of Pulse Check-off Systems







North Dakota 1.0 Refundable
Idaho 1.0 Non-refundable
Washington 1.0 Non-refundable
Australia (all crops) 1.0 Non-refundable
Source: Saskatchewan Pulse Growers documents.
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2.5.3 Administration of R&D Investment
Allocation of Check-Off Revenue
The pulse check-off revenue has been used for a number of activities, including R&D expen-
ditures, market promotion, communication, and general operations. Figure 2.10 depicts SPG’s
expenditure pattern during the last ten years. R&D investment is the major expenditure of the
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Figure 2.10: SPG Expenditure Trends
Source: Saskatchewan Pulse Growers Annual Report 2001 – 2013.
The major proportion of SPG’s R&D investment is used to support the pulse breeding pro-
grams at the Crop Development Centre (CDC) at the University of Saskatchewan. The principal
role of the CDC is to increase the diversification of crops by improving existing crops, creating
new uses for traditional crops, and introducing new crops. The major output of the CDC is
new seed varieties with higher yield and improved quality such as disease resistance, chemical
tolerance, drought tolerance and cold tolerance.
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Check-Offs R&D Investment 
Figure 2.11: Innovation Flow for Saskatchewan Pulse Industry
Source: Developed by the author.
Figure 2.11 illustrates how R&D funding is generated in the Canadian pulse industry and
how the innovation results get back to pulse farmers. First, pulse farmers in Saskatchewan pay
the check-off to their producer association, the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers. SPG then uses the
check-off money to fund research projects conducted by the CDC. Innovations take the form of
new and improved seed varieties. After the new variety seeds have been successfully developed,
CDC sells the seed directly to farmers at a royalty-free price that covers the cost of replicating
the seed.
However, Gray et al. [2008] show that the B/C ratio for the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers is
15.8 to 1, the internal rate of return (IRR) is 39.0 per cent from 1984 to 2012; the B/C is 20.2
to 1 and the IRR is 39.5 per cent over the period 1984 to 2024. The empirical evidence suggests
that despite a rise in the check-off ratio to one percent in 2003, there is still underinvestment in
pulse crops.
2.6 Summary
The evidence presented in this chapter shows that pulses have become an important crop in
Western Canada. An important factor in the rise of pulse crop production is R&D funding
carried out largely by the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers through a producer levy. Although this
levy was increased to one percent in 2003, estimates of the rate of return to pulse R&D suggest
that underinvestment is still an issue.
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It was suggested in the chapter 1 that farmers’ investment decisions might be affected by
the so-called horizon problem – i.e., the farmers’ membership horizon is shorter than the R&D
payback time horizon. To address how the horizon problem influences the R&D investment
decisions of a producer group, an analysis of this issue is conducted in the next chapter.
To allow the analysis to focus first on the horizon problem, the analysis in chapter 3 assumes
Canada is a small country – i.e., Canadian production has no impact on the world price. However,
this assumption is not realistic. As the data in this chapter show, Canada is the largest exporter of
pulses in the world, which means that the added production from agricultural R&D investment
will affect the world price and thus the welfare of both domestic and foreign consumers and
producers. The more realistic situation where Canada is assumed to be a large country exporter
is examined in Chapters 4 and 5.
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Agricultural R&D investment is becoming an increasingly important policy issue as food prices
push upwards and food security problems emerge [Alston et al., 2009a]. Understanding the
factors that determine R&D investment is an important element in addressing these issues and
problems.
R&D investment is undertaken by three key groups – government, the private sector, and
agricultural producers. In spite of its high rate of return, the growth rate of public research
funding in the developed countries has fallen over the last 40 years [Alston et al., 2010]. As
Alston et al. [2010] conclude, since the 1990s the growth in public research funding in OECD
countries has dropped below that of the developing countries. In Canada, the total real public
agricultural R&D funding has fallen from $Cdn 520.7 million in 1981 to $Cdn 474.3 million in
2000 [Alston et al., 2010].
While public funding has fallen in Canada, private investment has increased dramatically
since 1981, particularly in industries such as canola which have well-developed systems that can
restrict the use of new varieties (e.g., hybrids, patents on genes). Consequently, private funding
has become a larger component of total agricultural R&D investment; its share in total research
funding has increased from 17 percent in 1981 [Alston et al., 2010] to 39 percent in 2007 [Gray
and Weseen, 2008].
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The third important source of agricultural R&D funding is from producer check-offs, which
are increasingly being used to fund applied agricultural research such as disease management,
genetic improvement, and weed control. It is argued that the producer check-off is a desirable
way to fund agricultural R&D because taxing producers directly is more efficient than taxing the
general population [Alston et al., 2003]. As well, the pricing of varieties produced by producer
check-offs is often different from the pricing of varieties produced by investor-owned firms.
While investor-owned firms will typically price varieties to maximize the returns to the investors
(to do so they often rely on strong intellectual property rights), varieties produced by producer-
funded organizations are often priced to cover the cost of seed production (the cost of the
R&D has already been paid for through the check-off). The higher prices by investor-owned
firms can generate efficiency losses compared to the average cost pricing practiced by producer
organizations. Therefore, producer check-offs often represent the most efficient way of raising
money and carrying out R&Ds among the three major funding models [Alston, 2007].
Existing studies of producer-funded agricultural R&D indicate that there are high private
and social rates of return to agricultural R&D investment by farmers, and thus that farmers are
under investing in R&D. For example, Table 3.1 shows that western Canadian wheat producers
receive 4.40 dollars for every one dollar they invest in R&D through producer check-offs, while
barley producers receive 12.40 dollars for every one dollar they invest [Scott et al., 2005]. In the
pulse area, Saskatchewan pulse growers obtain 15.80 dollars for every one dollar they invest in
R&D through producer check-offs; the internal rates of return (IRR) are 39.0 percent and 39.5
percent in the short-run and long-run, respectively [Gray et al., 2008]. Since these B/C ratios and
IRRs are high compared to what would be expected if R&D investments were being made to
maximize producer welfare, the implication is that farmers do not invest enough in agricultural
R&D.
There are a number of explanations as to why farmer organizations would underinvest in
R&D. These problems include the free-rider problem, the portfolio problem, the control problem,
the heterogeneity problem, and the horizon problem [Olson, 1971; Jensen and Meckling, 1979;
Cook, 1995; Alston and Fulton, 2012; Vitaliano, 1983]. These problems emerge because of the
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Table 3.1: Benefit-Cost Ratio and IRR for Canadian Producers
Producers Benefit-Cost Ratio and IRR
West Canadian Wheat Producers1 4.4 to 1
Barley Producers1 12.4 to 1
Saskatchewan Pulse Producers2 15.8 to 1 IRR= 39% (Short-Run)
20.2 to 1 IRR=39.5% (Long-Run)
Source: 1Scott et al. [2005].
2Gray et al. [2008].
individual incentives facing producers in a collective organization and because of the manner in
which decisions are made within the organization.
Given the long period of time over which the benefits of R&D investment occur, the horizon
problem would appear to be of particular interest. For instance, Alston et al. [2010] argue that
the benefits of agricultural R&D may occur for as long as 50 years, with the maximum benefits
occurring at approximately 25 years on average. Since the average age of Canadian farmers is
54 years (Statistics Canada) and their membership horizons are about 15 to 20 years (assuming
their retirement age is 69 to 74), farmers’ planning horizons are much shorter than the benefit
horizon associated with the R&D – in short, farmers will not collect the entire benefits of the
R&D investment during the time horizon of their membership. Since estimates of the rates of
return to research have used the longer benefit horizon rather than the shorter planning horizon,
the empirical estimates of the rate of return to research may have overstated the rate of return
that farmers believe they will obtain. If this is the case, then the incentive for farmers to make
an investment in R&D may not be as high as has been believed.
3.2 Research Objectives
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact of the horizon problem on the rate of
return to agricultural R&D undertaken by producer organizations. Specifically, the analysis in
this chapter calculates the internal rate of return – i.e., IRRh – associated with the farmers’
planning horizon and compares this to the internal rate of return – i.e., IRR – associated with the
benefit horizon of the R&D. The impact of the horizon problem is determined by examining the
difference between IRRh and IRR.
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The organization of this chapter is as follows. The analysis begins with the development of
a framework that can be used to examine the impact of the horizon problem. The analysis then
moves to the development of a theoretical model for determining IRRh in the case of a constant
returns to scale Cobb-Douglas (C-D) production function. Section 3.6 introduces an empirical
examination of the horizon problem, while section 3.7 examines the sensitivity of the results via
a Monte Carlo simulation. Section 3.8 discusses the impact of land tenure on the horizon prblem.
3.3 Literature Review
There are a number of explanations as to why farmer organizations would underinvest in R&D.
These explanations generally focus on the collective nature of farmer organizations and the diffi-
culties that collective organizations have in raising capital for investment. The typical problems
that are highlighted include the free-rider problem, the portfolio problem, the control problem,
the heterogeneity problem, and the horizon problem [Olson, 1971; Jensen and Meckling, 1979;
Cook, 1995; Alston and Fulton, 2012; Vitaliano, 1983].
• The Free-Rider Problem
The public good nature of agricultural R&D means that farmers face a free rider problem –
since each member in the group can obtain the benefits without making the investment, individual
producers have no incentive to invest, which in turn leads to insufficient R&D funding and the
lack of the resulting benefits [Olson, 1971]. In short, the public good nature of R&D creates a
Prisoners’ Dilemma – although the whole group would be better off if each producer were to
invest, there is no incentive for producers to make this investment.
One way to address the free-rider problem is to introduce legislation that requires farmers
to pay a levy on sales. Although many check-off schemes allow farmers to request a refund
(the so-called mandatory refundable schemes), the transaction cost to farmers of doing so is
typically substantial enough that most farmers do not request refunds; the result is that mandatory
refundable check-off schemes can raise funds for R&D. However, there is a limit to the amount of
funds that can be raised through such schemes because as the levy rate is increased, the incentive
to request a refund rises, thus limiting the increase in funds that is attainable. Therefore, in effect,
the free rider problem becomes more and more important as the levy rate rises.
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Another form of check-off scheme to address the free-rider problem is so-called mandatory
non-refundable check-off system – farmers pay the check-off at the first point of sale, but not
allowed to ask for refunds. Producers who pay the check-off are automatically enrolled in the
producer association, hence pay the funds for R&D activities. Under this mechanism, each
individual farmer in the association pays for R&D, and the free-rider problem is addressed.
• The Portfolio Problem
The portfolio problem emerges when farmers are forced to contribute to group interests that
constrain their diversification across assets [Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Cook, 1995; Vitaliano,
1983]. Collective investments, such as group check-offs and the subsequent investment in R&D,
can be seen as part of farmers’ investment portfolio. Given that R&D investment is highly risky
(only about 10% of the research experiments will succeed), risk averse farmers may wish to
direct their investment away from R&D towards other assets, thereby reducing their willingness
to invest in R&D. At a collective level, this desire to shift investment away from R&D will
manifest itself in reduced checkoff levies.
• The Control Problem
The control problem is effectively the principal-agent problem. It arises when the board of
directors (the principal) is not able to monitor fully the actions of the manager (the agent); as a
consequence the manager is able to pursue his or her own interests rather than those of the board
[Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Cook, 1995]. The goals of the principal and the agent may diverge
for a number of reasons. One important reason is that although R&D is a long term investment,
the manager’s performance is typically evaluated in the short run. As a result, the manager has
an incentive to engage in short term investments rather than long-term investments. If short term
investments generate lower rates of return, the result is an underinvestment in R&D. Fulton
and Larson [2009] provide an analysis of the problems associated with the control problem in
the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, a producer-owned enterprise operating in the grains industry in
western Canada.
• The Heterogeneity Problem
The heterogeneity problem argues that the benefit of R&D is not the same across producers.
If decisions are made on the basis of majority rule and the median producer – i.e., the producer
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that is pivotal in deciding the outcome – is someone who finds the R&D benefits to be particularly
small, then the resulting decision is one that would result in underinvestment. Requirements for
supermajorities (e.g., in order to satisfy political demands for substantial agreement) will further
exacerbate the problem. [Alston and Fulton, 2012].
• The Horizon Problem
The horizon problem is also believed to be an important explanation for underinvestment by
members in a group. As Jensen and Meckling [1979]; Cook [1995] and Vitaliano [1983] argue,
the horizon problem occurs when people’s individual time horizon (T) of staying in the group
(their planning horizon) is shorter than the expected payback time (LR) of the investment (see
Figure 3.1).
t LR T 
Total R&D Benefits 
Farmers’ R&D Benefits 
0 
Figure 3.1: The Horizon Problem
Since agricultural R&D is a long-term investment, the horizon problem may have partic-
ular importance for R&D investment decisions. Moreover, it is likely to become increasingly
important to producer-funded R&D as the average age of farmers increases. For instance, in
Canada, the average age of Canadian farmers has risen from 49 in 2001 to 54 in 2011. As well,
the proportion of farm operators that are age 55 or over has increased from 32.1 percent in 1991
to 34.9 percent in 2006 to 48.3 percent in 2011 (Statistics Canada). Such a increasing trend
of aging farm population calls for a deeper economic analysis of the decision-horizon related
consequences of producer-funded R&D. This study is an effort in this direction.
The severity, and even the existence, of the horizon problem has long been debated. Cook
[1995] argues that for cooperatives “the severity of the horizon problem intensifies when con-
sidering investment in research and development, advertisement, and other intangible assets.”
Featherstone and Goodwin [1993] empirically conclude that older farmers in the United States
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have a lower level of investment in conservation technologies. In contrast, Fulton and Giannakas
[2012] argue that in cooperatives, the horizon problem is less severe than believed because of a
different objective function (cooperative members are interested in consumer surplus plus profit,
while investor-owned firms are interested only in profits). The presence of open membership
for group members also has an important effect, since this membership structure introduces
a behavioural norm, that if followed, encourages members to invest today in return for the
benefits that emerge from investments by members in previous periods. Olesen [2007] claims
that the horizon problem is likely to cause over-investment rather than underinvestment, while
Fahlbeck [2007] does find no empirical support for the horizon problem in Swedish agricultural
co-operatives.
The impact of the horizon problem is also likely affected by land tenure relationships. This
chapter will examine three cases – the decision-maker is a tenant farmer, the decision-maker is
a non-farmer landowner, and the decision-maker is a farmer-landowner. The model is initially
developed for the case of a tenant farmer and then extended to the other two cases.
To examine the severity (or the significance) of the horizon problem, the focus of the research
in this chapter is the mandatory non-refundable levy scheme. Since this scheme removes the free-
rider problem, focusing on it makes it possible to isolate the impact of the horizon problem. To
do so, however, requires that the other factors discussed above are not also at work. It is assumed
that because the magnitude of the levy is reasonably small (only one percent of farmers’ total
sales), the portfolio problem is not a major issue. Although the control problem and heterogeneity
problem are likely to be at work, these problems emerge because of the manner in which decisions
are made within an organization, not because of the way in which farmers view the returns. The
examination of the horizon problem in this chapter focuses on the benefits to producers; once
these benefits are understood it then becomes possible to examine the impact of decision-making
structures.
3.4 A Framework for Analyzing the Horizon Problem
The analysis begins with the development of a formal theoretical model to determine the impact
of a change in the current check-off ratio for producer-funded R&D. The focus of the analysis is
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on R&D expenditures in a producer organization that operates with a non-refundable mandatory
check-off scheme.
Agricultural R&D generates costs and benefits to producers that participate in a check-off or
levy scheme. The marginal cost of a single-period levy increase is a one-shot cost MC0 in time
period t = 0. The marginal benefits that occur in future time periods t are denoted as MBt. As
Figure 3.2 shows, the model assumes that the MBt are created by a change in the check-off ratio
from lp to l′p at period t = 0; the check-off ratio then returns to the original level lp in period
t = 1 and all remaining periods. The internal rate of return – IRR – calculated over the benefit
horizon is given by the solution to
∑LR
t=1 MBt/(1 + IRR)
t = MC0, where LR is the total lag
length for research. In contrast, the internal rate of return – IRRh – calculated over the farmers’
planning horizon is given by
∑T
t=1 MBt/(1 + IRRh)
t = MC0 where T is the planning horizon.
A comparison of IRRh with IRR determines the impact of the horizon problem.
 








Figure 3.2: The Pattern of The Change in Check-Off Ratio
Source: Developed by the author.
The IRR is chosen over other investment criteria such as net present value (NPV) for at least
two reasons. First, the IRR is a commonly-used criteria to measure R&D returns (see Alston
et al. [2000]). Focusing on the IRR allows for the choice of a base value of IRR that is consistent
with the values found in the previous literature. Second, the calculation of the NPV requires the
specification of a discount rate. Given the heterogeneity of farmers, it is likely that farmers hold
a range of discount rates. Using the IRR avoids the need to determine a discount rate for the
analysis.
The use of the IRR implicitly assumes that the benefits from an investment can be reinvested
at the same rate as the IRR of the investment under consideration. Such an assumption appears
35
Decisions of Producer-Funded Agricultural Research and Development
to be appropriate in the case of R&D funding, since opportunities do exist in principle for the
reinvestment of the benefits at the IRR.
The above conceptual analysis of the horizon problem is presented graphically in figure
3.3, where DEF represents the cumulative NPV of the marginal R&D benefits for a given lag
distribution, a given discount rate IRR, and a given benefit horizon LR. Thus, at t = LR, this
curve gives the cumulative NPV of the R&D benefits for all t ∈ [1, LR], i.e.,
∑LR
t=1 MBt/(1 +
IRR)t; and at t = T1 it represents the cumulative NPV of R&D benefits for all t ∈ [1, T1], i.e.,∑T1
t=1 MBt/(1+IRR)
t. Notably, after T, DEF becomes very flat; this occurs because the discount
factor 1/(1+ IRR)t is very small and the discounted MBt adds very little value to the cumulative
R&D benefits. Note that IRR is the discount rate that makes the NPV of the R&D benefits equal
to the current R&D cost MC0.
Suppose that the producers’ time horizon is given by T < LR. Because of the flatness of
the cumulative R&D benefit curve, IRRh differs only slightly from IRR (recall that IRRh is the
discount rate that makes
∑T
t=1 MBt/(1 + IRRh)
t = MC0). Thus, the horizon problem is not a
significant issue as long as the farmers’ planning horizon is greater than or equal to T .
If the individual time horizon is T2 years, then at t = T2, the cumulative NPV of R&D
benefits is smaller than the R&D cost by m2. To equate the marginal benefits with the marginal
cost, the research benefits have to be discounted with a smaller discount rate, i.e., IRRh2. The
cumulative NPV of R&D benefits with IRRh2 can be demonstrated by curve DG in figure 3.3;
the dashed line means the benefits after T2 are truncated.
As is clear from figure 3.3, the shorter is the time horizon T , the smaller is IRRh – i.e., the
larger is the impact of the horizon problem. For instance, if the individual time horizon is t = T1,
then the benefit-cost-gap m1 becomes larger; to compensate the cost research benefits have to
be discounted with a even smaller discount rate IRRh1.
3.5 The Theoretical Model
For producer-funded R&D, what is important are the benefits seen by those farmers that effec-
tively make the decision in the organization – these farmers are referred to as the pivotal farmers.
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Cumulative NPV of R&D Benefits 
with IRR  
R&D Cost 
LR t T T2T1 0 
Cumulative NPV of R&D Benefits with IRRh2 
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Figure 3.3: A Conceptual Model of the Horizon Problem: Marginal Cumulative Benefits versus
Marginal Cost
Source: Developed by the author.
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If the pivotal farmers do not see the full benefits of R&D, they can be expected to make decisions
that underinvest in R&D.
The purpose of this section is to derive the marginal internal rate of return – i.e., the internal
rate of return on the marginal R&D investment. To do this, a model determining the optimal
R&D investment, via an optimal levy rate, is developed. The marginal internal rate of return
is then determined from the first-order condition for this problem. This calculation is carried
out by taking the current levy rate as given and finding the discount rate that makes the first-
order condition equal to zero. Note that this procedure reverses the normal practice of taking the
discount rate as given and finding the levy rate that equals marginal benefit with marginal cost.
As will be seen, the first-order condition involves the equating of the discounted value of future
benefits with an immediate cost; hence the need for a discount rate.
The determination of the optimal R&D investment can be modelled as a two-stage sequential
game with complete information. In stage one, the pivotal farmer determines the R&D invest-
ment, which in turn augments the cumulative knowledge stock of the industry. In stage two,
farmers in the group take the knowledge stock as given and determine their profit-maximizing
level of output. The game is solved backwards – i.e., given the knowledge stock, the optimal
profit of the individual farmer is determined; with the knowledge of this optimal profit, the opti-
mal R&D is determined. To make the problem tractable, the analysis is carried out for the case
of the Cobb-Douglas production function.
3.5.1 Stage 2 – Determination of the Optimal Output
Consider an individual tenant farmer (the pivotal farmer) in a producer association with a Cobb-
Douglas production function




t (A > 0; 0 < α, β < 1;α + β = 1) (3.1)
where yt is the output in period t, xt is a composite conventional input (e.g., labor, land and
machinery) in period t, and Kt is the cumulated stock of industry R&D knowledge in period
t, and the parameter A is a positive constant. Since the pivotal farmer determines the check-off
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ratio, which consequently determines the knowledge stock, Kt is effectively a choice variable
for the pivotal farmer.
This study assumes constant returns to scale (CRS), i.e., α+ β = 1. Since farmers are price
takers in both input and output markets, they cannot operate under increasing returns to scale (as
Fulton [1997] notes, increasing returns to scale requires that firms possess some degree of market
power). If farmers operated under decreasing returns to scale over all levels of production, then
farm size would be infinitesimal, an outcome that is not realistic for Canadian producers. Thus,
CRS is a reasonable assumption for the present model.




pit = P (1− lt)yt − Pxxt s.t. yt = AxβtKαt ,
where P and Px are the output and input prices, respectively, and lt is the check-off ratio in
period t – i.e., the percentage of the total revenue paid to the producer association as a check-off.
Therefore, P (1− lt) is the net output price that farmers receive.
Substituting the production function into the profit function gives:
max
xt
pit = P (1− lt)AxβtKαt − Pxxt (3.2)
The first-order condition (F.O.C.) can be derived as:
∂pit
∂xt
= P (1− lt)Aβxβ−1t Kαt − Px = 0,
The second-order condition (S.O.C.) can be written as:
∂2pit
∂x2t
= P (1− lt)Aβ(β − 1)xβ−2t Kαt < 0. (3.3)
For (3.3) to hold requires 0 < β < 1.
Solving the F.O.C. gives the optimal input demand for the pivotal farmer as follows:
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Normalizing the input price to unity – i.e., Px = 1, equation (3.4) can be rewritten as:
x∗t (P, lt, Kt) = [P (1− lt)AβKαt ]
1
1−β
Since α + β = 1, the above equation can be rewritten as:
x∗t (P, lt, Kt) = [P (1− lt)Aβ]
1
αKt (3.5)
Substituting equation (3.5) into equation (3.1) gives the output supply function:







Substituting equation (3.5) into equation (3.2) gives the indirect profit function:






αKt − [P (1− lt)Aβ] 1αKt (3.7)
Collecting terms, equation (3.7) can be rewritten as:




αα[P (1− lt)] 1αKt. (3.8)
3.5.2 Stage 1 – Determination of the Optimal Levy
In stage one, the pivotal farmer decides the R&D investment. From equation (3.8), the indirect
profit at t = 0 can be derived as:




αα[P (1− l0)] 1αK0 (3.9)
The impact of a change of l0 on pi0 can be defined by taking the derivative of equation (3.9) with
respect to l0, i.e.,
∂pi∗0
∂l0
= −(PA) 1αβ βα (1− l0)
β
αK0 < 0, (3.10)
Equation (3.10) indicates that an increase in the check-off ratio in period t = 0 causes a reduction




α (1− l0) βαK0 is thus the marginal cost of a levy increase.
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Equation (3.8) indicates that farmer profits in period t are a function of the industry R&D
knowledge stock in period t. Since the knowledge stock in any period is determined by the R&D
investments made previously, it is important to model the manner by which investments in R&D
affect future knowledge stocks. Specifically, it is necessary to determine how check-off decisions
made in the current period (period zero) affect the profits of farmers in future periods.
Based on Alston et al. [2010] (p. 276), this study defines the knowledge stock in period t as




ωsEt−s ∀ t ∈ [1, LR] (3.11)
The extensive form of equation (3.11) can be written as follows:
K1 = ω1E0 + ω2E−1 + · · ·+ ωLRE1−LR
K2 = ω1E1 + ω2E0 + · · ·+ ωLRE2−LR
...
KLR = ω1ELR−1 + ω2ELR−2 + · · ·+ ωLRE0,
(3.12)
whereLR is the time length over which current R&D affects the knowledge stock, s is the number
of years since the initial R&D investment; E0 is the investment in the current time period (year
0), E−1 is the investment in the year before the current period, and ωs is the lag weight.
The lag weight gives the impact on the knowledge stock for R&D expenditures in each year,
and can be expressed as follows:
ωt =
(t− g + 1) η1−ηλt−g
LR∑
t=1
(t− g + 1) η1−ηλt−g
for g < t 6 LR; otherwise ωt = 0, (3.13)
where g is the gestation lag before research begins to affect productivity, η and λ are parameters
that define the shape of the distribution (0 6 η < 1; 0 6 λ < 1 ), t is the number of years since
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For simplicity, assume all check-off revenues are used for R&D investment, thus the check-off
revenues equal R&D expenditures. Since Et = ltPyt , it follows that







Given the above, the change in the knowledge stock in period t with respect to a change in the































Taking the derivative of pi∗t in equation (3.8) with respect to l0 gives the marginal impact of l0 on







αα[P (1− lt)] 1α ∂Kt
∂l0
(3.18)








α K0ωt(1− lt) 1α (1− l0)
β−α
α (α− l0) > 0 (3.19)
Equation (3.19) indicates that an increase in the current check-off ratio (i.e., the current R&D












)(α− l0)− (1− l0)
β−α
α ] < 0. (3.20)
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3.5.3 Calculation of the Marginal Rate of Return
Instead of calculating the optimal check-off ratio, this study calculates the marginal internal rate
of return to the pivotal farmer, and then determines how the horizon problem affects this internal









pi∗t (l0)/(1 + r)
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(3.21)
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is the marginal cost of R&D investment and
∂pi∗t
∂l0
is the marginal R&D benefit in
year t, t ∈ [1, LR].
Substituting equation (3.10) and (3.19) into (3.23) gives:









α K0ωt(1−lt) 1α (1−l0)
β−α
α (α−l0)/(1+r)t = 0 (3.24)
Assuming that lt is chosen so that lt = l0, then equation (3.24) can be rewritten as follows:











α (α− l0)/(1 + r)t = 0 (3.25)
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Note that l0 has to be smaller thanα, otherwise there is no solution for this equation. The discount
rate that solves the above equation is the marginal internal rate of return IRR for the time length













If the producer association suffers from the horizon problem, then the optimal l0 is determined
by simply truncating the R&D benefits to the first T years – i.e., the time horizon that the pivotal
farmer benefits from investments made by the producer association. Consequently, the internal














The focus of much of the literature on agricultural R&D has been on the internal rate of return
[Alston et al., 2000], with high estimates of the internal rate of return indicating that underinvest-
ment has occurred. In keeping with this approach, this section empirically estimates the internal
rate of return IRRh that a pivotal producer can be expected to see given her benefit horizon. To
undertake this analysis, a series of assumptions have to be made regarding the gestation lag g
(i.e., the time until the first benefits of R&D occur), the lag distribution of ωt (i.e., the pattern of
the benefits over time), the internal rate of return IRR over the entire payback horizon of R&D
investment, and the benefit horizon T of the pivotal farmer. Given these assumptions, the internal
rate of return IRRh can be calculated. The impact of the horizon problem is then determined by
examining the magnitude of the deviation of IRRh from IRR.
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3.6.1 Methodology
In what follows, we use Microsoft Excel to solve for IRRh given assumptions about the various
parameters. The IRR value is taken from Alston et al. [2010], who calculated the marginal IRR
for agricultural R&D in the United States to be 0.234. The baseline value assumed for this
analysis is 0.25; sensitivity analysis calculations were also carried out for values of 0.15, 0.20,
and 0.30.
Following Alston et al. [2010], this analysis assumes the lag weights have a gamma distri-
bution (equation 3.13) described by the parameters η and λ. It is assumed that these parameters
take on values of 0.60, 0.65, 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85, 0.90, and 0.95. The maximum lag length LR
is assumed to be 50 years, while it is assumed that the gestation lag g takes four different values
– namely zero, five, ten and fifteen years.
Figure 3.4 demonstrates that, for a given g and η, the larger is λ, the later is the time at which
the lag weights peak, while for a given g and λ, the larger is η, the later is the time at which the
lag weights peak. Note also that an increase in η and λ results in a flatter lag distribution. Since
a later peak corresponds to a flatter distribution, the peak year is used as an index to represent
both the shape and location of the lag distribution.
It is assumed that the knowledge stock factor share α takes a value of 0.10, while the output
price P is set at 2.0. The current check-off ratio l0 is assumed to be one percent, and the current
knowledge stock K0 is assumed to be 1.0.
Given the above assumptions, it is possible to solve for the value of the parameter A in the
Cobb-Douglas production function that ensures that a one percent check-off levy generates an

















The values of Aˆ for the different assumed values of g, η,λ and IRR are shown in the Appendix.
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g=0 g=5 g=10 g=15
Figure 3.4: Gamma Distribution of The Lag Weights
Note: (1) Source: Calculated by the author based on Alston et al. [2010]; (2) The peak year labeled in each grid
applies for the case of g=0.
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3.6.2 Results and Implications
The horizon IRRh is affected by four key variables – the shape of the lag distribution (captured
by η and λ), the gestation lag g, the value of IRR, and the individual time horizon T. The impact
of each of these variables on IRRh is considered in turn.
The Shape of the Lag Distribution
The impact of the lag distribution shape on the horizon IRRh can be seen in Figures 3.5 to 3.8.
A visual inspection reveals that for a given g and T, with a fixed value of η, the larger is λ, the
greater is the deviation of IRRh from IRR. Similarly, with a fixed value of λ, the larger is η, the
greater is the deviation of IRRh from IRR. The deviation of IRRh from IRR is interpreted as the
impact of the horizon problem.
For example, in the case of gestation lag g = 5 and time horizon T=10, when η = 0.8 – i.e.,
the bottom row in Figure 3.5 and the bottom row of Table 3.2 – as λ takes the value of 0.6, 0.7,
and 0.8, IRRh falls from 0.16 to 0.10, then to 0.03. As well, when λ = 0.8 – i.e., the last column
in Figure 3.5 and Table 3.2, as the value of η increases from 0.6 to 0.7 to 0.8, IRRh falls from
0.19 to 0.14 to 0.03.
Table 3.2: IRRh with Different Values of η and λ: g = 5, T=10
IRRh
λ 0.6 0.7 0.8
η percentage
0.6 23 21 19
0.7 21 18 14
0.8 16 10 3
Source: Calculated by the author.
The above empirical analysis suggests that it is appropriate to derive the following result:
Result 3.1. The impact of the horizon problem is affected by the lag weight distribution. For a
given gestation lag g, the later the lag peaks, i.e., the larger the values of η and λ, the greater is
the deviation of IRRh from IRR and thus the larger is the impact of the horizon problem, ceteris
paribus.
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g=0 g=5 g=10 g=15
(1)
Figure 3.5: Empirical Result of The Horizon IRR for IRR = 0.25
Source: Calculated by the author.
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(18)
Figure 3.6: Empirical Result of The Horizon IRR for IRR = 0.3
Source: Calculated by the author.
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(27)
Figure 3.7: Empirical Result of The Horizon IRR for IRR = 0.2
Source: Calculated by the author.
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(36)
Figure 3.8: Empirical Result of The Horizon IRR for IRR = 0.15
Source: Calculated by the author.
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The Gestation Lag
Consider now the gestation lag. As figure 3.4 shows, an increase in the gestation lag g simply
moves out the peak year of the lag distribution. For instance, when g = 0, the peak year is four
years for η = 0.7 and λ = 0.6 (grid iv); the peak year becomes nine years when g = 5.
As a consequence of this relationship, the longer is the gestation lag g, the later is the time
period at which current R&D investment begins to generate benefits, and therefore, the larger is
the deviation of IRRh from IRR, ceteris peribus. This pattern can be seen in Figures 3.5 to 3.8
which show that the difference between IRR and IRRh increases as g increases.
The above analysis suggests that it is appropriate to derive the following result:
Result 3.2. For a given lag weight distribution (η and λ), the impact of the horizon problem
is affected by the gestation lag g. The longer is the gestation lag, the bigger is the deviation of
IRRh from IRR, and thus the larger is the impact of the horizon problem.
Time Horizon and IRR
A visual inspection of figures 3.5 to 3.8 reveals that IRRh falls as T decreases within any given
parameter combination, Thus, ceteris paribus, the shorter is T , the larger is the impact of the
horizon problem on IRRh. Finally, Figures 3.5 to 3.8 show that the deviation of IRRh from IRR
is not obviously affected by the magnitude of IRR.
The results presented in this section provide a visual examination of the horizon problem for
a specified set of parameter values. The next section provides a more quantitative analysis of the
horizon problem through the use of a Monte Carlo simulation.
3.7 Monte Carlo Simulation
The purpose of this section is to estimate the probability density function of the horizon IRRh
for a set of randomly generated parameters η, λ and IRR by sampling from known distributions
of these parameters. The Monte Carlo simulations are done using Wolfram Mathematica.
In the Monte Carlo analysis, the population means for η and λ were set at 0.80 and 0.75,
respectively. Alston et al. [2010] (p. 276-277) argued that to generate a plausible lag weight
distribution, the parameters η and λ should be greater than 0.5 and smaller than 1. In fact, to
satisfy the gamma distribution of lag weights in equation (3.13) requires η and λ ∈ [0, 1).
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Assuming that the maximum value of one is within three standard deviations of the mean, the















Therefore, η ∼ N(0.8, 0.072), and λ ∼ N(0.75, 0.082). The population mean for the marginal
IRR was set at 23.4 percent and the standard deviation was set at 0.17 as calculated by Alston
et al. [2010] (p. 403). Thus, IRR ∼ N(0.234, 0.172). The parameter g was set equal to zero.
The Monte Carlo analysis was undertaken by making 1,000 draws and for calculating IRRh
each draw. Each draw included a random selection of η, λ, and IRR from their individual
distributions respectively. These three distributions were assumed to be statistically independent.
The result of the Monte Carlo simulation can be seen in Figure 3.9. The PDF function for
T=50 represents the probability density function for IRR. The PDF functions for T=20, 15, 10,
and 5 years represent the probability density functions of IRRh for different individual farmer
planning time horizons T . The order of the location for the PDF from right to left is the PDF with
individual time horizon of T = 50 to T = 5. Figure 3.9 shows that as the membership horizon
T decreases from T=50 to 5, the PDF function moves to the left, the expected IRRh decreases,
and its variance increases.
The means and variances of the PDFs for each horizon IRRh are numerically presented in
Table 3.3. The second last column of the table is the percentage difference between the mean
of IRRh and the mean of IRR, i.e., (Mean IRRh-Mean IRR)/Mean IRR. The last column of the
table is the percentage difference between the variance of IRRh to the variance of IRR, i.e., (Var
IRRh-Var IRR)/Var IRR.
As both Figure 3.9 and Table 3.3 show, the mean of the IRRh falls and the variance increases
as the membership horizon falls. Therefore, the following results can be derived:
Result 3.3. As the membership horizon T decreases, the expected IRRh decreases and its variance
increases.
53














Probability Density Functions for IRR
Figure 3.9: Probability Density Functions for IRRs
Source: Developed by the author.
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Table 3.3: Mean and Variance of the Distributions
Percentage Difference Percentage Difference
Time Horizon Mean of IRRh Variance of IRRh in the Mean in the Variance
percentage
T=50 0.239 0.1552 - -
T=40 0.239 0.1552 0 0
T=30 0.238 0.1562 -0.4 1.3
T=20 0.231 0.1612 -3.3 7.9
T=15 0.214 0.1692 -10.5 18.9
T=10 0.148 0.1932 -38.1 55.0
T=9 0.119 0.2022 -50.2 69.8
T=8 0.080 0.2132 -66.5 88.8
T=7 0.025 0.2282 -89.5 116.4
T=6 −0.051 0.2442 -121.3 147.8
T=5 -0.158 0.2622 -166.1 185.7
Source: Developed by the author.
As Table 3.3 shows, although the mean of IRRh falls as T decreases, the mean of IRR20 is
nearly identical with the mean of IRR (23.1% vs 23.9%). Even when T=15, the mean of IRR15
is very close to the mean of IRR (21.4% vs 23.9%). At T=10, the value of IRRh is still high –
14.8% – although the difference between IRR10 and IRR is substantial (the difference is nearly
40%). The mean of IRRh falls to a single digit when T is less than nine years. This observation
indicates that the horizon problem is not an issue to impact the R&D investment decisions unless
T is very short.
Given that the average age of Canadian producers is 54 years and their membership horizon
is 15 to 20 years (assume their expected retirement age is 69 to 74), the results presented in Table
3.3 suggest that the horizon problem is not likely a significant issue for Canadian producers.
Although shorter time horizons do lead to smaller IRRs, the decrease in IRR is not likely to be
large enough to have a major effect on the returns that can be expected from investment in R&D.
The above analysis assumed that farmers are only concerned about profit maximization.
However, farmers may consider other factors when making R&D investment decisions, such as
the health of their land and the welfare of future generations. Concern with such factors can be
expected to provide further incentives for farmers to invest in R&D. Thus, the results of this
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study support the conclusion that the horizon problem is not likely to be a major cause of the
underinvestment observed in agricultural R&D. Instead, the reason is likely to lie elsewhere.
3.8 Impact of Land Tenure on The Horizon Problem
The analysis to this point has assumed that the pivotal voter is a tenant farmer – as a tenant,
the farmer only sees the benefits of R&D while she is farming. However, other land tenure
relationships exist. For instance, it is common nowadays that land owners rent out their land,
such as in Saskatchewan 50 percent of farmers rent at least a portion of their farmland, and 39
percent of the total farmland is under lease [Saskatchewan-Government, 2007]. The purpose of
this section is to examine the impact of land tenure on the horizon problem.
If the pivotal decision-maker is a landowner, then standard economic theory suggests that
the horizon problem does not exist. The reason is that future R&D benefits can be expected to
be fully capitalized into land values under the assumption that the land price equals the sum of
discounted future rents (it is also assumed that the landowner has all the bargaining power and is
able to obtain all the benefits from any improvements that are made). Thus, even if the benefits
occur past the time the landowner is expected to own the land she will still benefit from future
R&D through an increase in land prices.
If the pivotal voter is a tenant farmer, as the above analysis indicates, the horizon problem
does not emerge until the membership horizon T is very small. As will be shown below, three
different cases are examined: the pivotal voter as farmer-tenant, the pivotal voter as a non-farmer
landowner, and the pivotal voter as a farmer-landowner.
The common leasing arrangements on farm land are the cash-rent lease and the crop-share
lease. With cash rent arrangements, the tenant receives the income from all crop sales but pays a
fixed cash payment to the landowner each year as land rent. The landowner receives a guaranteed
rent, while the tenant supplies labor, machinery and pays all expenses except for property taxes,
building insurance and major building repairs. In this case, the landowner is not a member of the
producer organization and thus is not involved in the R&D decision making. Instead, the tenant
is the registered group member, pays the levies and is eligible to vote in board elections. Thus,
in this case the tenant should be considered the pivotal voter.
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In the case of the crop-share lease, the non-farmer landlord receives a pre-negotiated share
of all crops grown on the leased land as the land rent, pays the property taxes, and supplies grain
storage. The tenant receives a pre-negotiated share of the crops and supplies the machinery, labor
and crop inputs. In this case, both the non-farmer landowner and the tenant are members of the
producer organization. They share the levy payment and both could be the pivotal voter.
Table 3.4 shows the impact on the horizon problem in the three cases outlined above: the
tenant farmer is the pivotal voter, the non-farmer landowner is the pivotal voter, and the farmer-
landowner is the pivotal farmer. As will be seen, these different pivotal voters have different
benefit horizons and consequently different IRRs for R&D investment decisions.
To interpret the results in Table 3.4, define the marginal R&D cost in equation (3.23) as








r)t. Let a (a ∈ [0, 1]) be the share of the R&D benefits and the marginal cost that are ob-
tained/undertaken by the tenant in a crop-share lease; thus, (1−a) is the share obtained/undertaken
by the non-farmer landowner. The share a depends on the bargaining power between the tenant
and the non-farmer landowner and on the general norms in the area (in Saskatchewan, for in-
stance, a historically was about two thirds). Kirwan [2009] provides evidence that, contrary to
the assumptions of the standard economic model of land pricing, the landowner does not capture
all of the benefits – in fact, he estimates that the tenant gets about 75 percent of the benefits.
Table 3.4: Land Tenure and the Horizon Problem
Pivotal Farmer Benefit Horizon R&D Costs R&D Benefits Horizon IRR
Tenant Farmer [1, T] aMC a
T∑
t=1
MBt/(1 + r)t IRRh
Non-Farmer Landowner [1, LR] (1− a)MC (1− a)
LR∑
t=1
MBt/(1 + r)t IRR









Source: Developed by the author.
Case 1: The tenant farmer is the pivotal voter
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If the tenant farmer is the pivotal voter, then her benefit horizon is T years. In a crop-share
lease, the tenant farmer incurs a proportion a of the R&D costs, i.e., aMC, in period t=0, while
her marginal R&D benefits are a
∑T
t=1 MBt/(1 + r)
t over the T year benefit horizon. In a cash
lease, the tenant incurs all the costs and all the benefits – i.e., a = 1. Given that both the costs
and the benefits are discounted by the same fraction a, the relevant internal rate of return for a
tenant farmer is thus the horizon IRRh calculated in the previous sections. As was shown above,
the horizon problem will not result in disincentives to invest in producer-funded R&D activities
unless the membership horizon is very short.
Case 2: The non-farmer landowner is the pivotal voter
In this case, since the pivotal voter is the non-farmer landowner, any benefits from the R&D
are capitalized into the land price. Although the landlord may only see a portion of the benefits
(depending on the value of a), the landlord also only incurs a portion of the costs. Consequently,
the internal rate of return is IRR and the horizon problem does not exist.
Case 3: The farmer-landowner is the pivotal voter
In this case, the pivotal voter owns the land and farms it until her retirement at T years;
after T, she rents the land to other farmers or sells it to other non-farmer landowners (if she
sells it to other farmer-landowners then the horizon problem vanishes). During the period [1,
T], the farmer-landowner incurs the entire R&D costs of MC and captures the entire R&D
benefits of
∑T
t=1 MBt/(1 + r)
t. After time period T, she either sells or rents out the land. If,
as a landlord, she (or another landlord she sells to) is not able to capture all the benefits from
the land (i.e., a > 0), then the R&D benefits are (1 − a)∑LRt=T MBt/(1 + r)t. The resulting




t+ (1−a)∑LRt=T MBt/(1+r)t = 0, and obviously IRRh <IRRl < IRR.
Because IRRl is greater than IRRh the horizon problem is less severe than when the tenant farmer
is the pivotal voter. Since the horizon problem is not an issue even in the case where the tenant
farmer is the pivotal farmer, it can be concluded that the horizon problem is not an issue in the
case the farmer-landowner is the pivotal voter.
Thus, the horizon problem is not affected by the land tenure arrangements. First, if the non-
farmer landowner is the pivotal voter then the horizon problem vanishes. Second, if the tenant
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farmer is the pivotal farmer, then, as the analysis in the previous section shows, the horizon
problem only emerges if the time horizon of the pivotal tenant farmer is very short. Finally, if
the farmer-landowner is the pivotal farmer, then the horizon problem is less severe than when
the tenant farmer is the pivotal voter, which in turn implies the horizon problem is unlikely to be
an issue.
3.9 Concluding Remarks
The horizon problem has been widely identified as an important factor affecting individual
investment behaviour in the context of a collective institution [Jensen and Meckling, 1979;
Cook, 1995; Vitaliano, 1983; Porter and Scully, 1987; Rey and Tirole, 2007]. Given the aging
farm population, the horizon problem emerges as a likely reason for the underinvestment that is
occurring in producer-funded R&D.
As expected, the study shows the horizon problem is determined by the gestation lag and the
lag weight distribution. The longer the gestation lag – i.e, the longer it takes to generate the first
benefit from an R&D investment, the larger is the impact of the horizon problem. In addition,
the longer it takes for the investment to generate its largest benefit – which is determined by
the lag weight distribution – the larger is the impact of the horizon problem. As the Monte
Carlo simulation results show, a shorter membership horizon both reduces the expected IRR and
increases its variance. This increase in variance is important, since to the extent that farmers are
risk averse, shorter time horizons can be expected to result in additional disincentives to invest in
R&D. Moreover, the impact of the horizon problem is not affected by land tenure relationships.
However, contrary to the view that the horizon problem is an important disincentive for
investment, this study shows the horizon problem is not likely to be the reason for the under-
investment of producer-funded R&D, unless farmers’ time horizon is very short (e.g., under 10
years). Given that the membership horizon for the average Canadian producer is 15 to 20 years,
the horizon problem is not an issue for Canadian producers. Furthermore, the analysis assumes
farmers only are concerned with profit maximization. However, farmer may also consider other
factors when making R&D investment decisions, such as future generations of agricultural pro-
ducers and environment issues. The results of this study show even under the extreme assumption
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of profit maximization, the horizon problem is not an issue for Canadian farmers, let alone in a
more realistic model implemented by including factors other than profit.
The implicit assumption of this study is that the institutional arrangements, such as the
voting mechanism, are exogenous. However, with the aging farm population in Canada, an
examination of the current voting mechanism is needed. For instance, is majority voting an
effective mechanism to generate sufficient collective research investment? What would be the
optimal mechanism design to generate sufficient R&D investment for producer organizations?
These are the research questions that need to be addressed in future studies.
The analysis in this chapter examines the decisions made by a single member of the group.
Implicit in this analysis is the idea that different members of the group will have different time
horizons, and hence different IRRs. The heterogeneous IRRs mean that producers have different
willingness to pay for R&D activities – i.e., different preferences for check-offs. For instance,
farmers with longer benefit horizons prefer a higher check-off ratio because they can capture
the research benefits over a longer period of time given the costs that are born by every member
today. However, farmers with shorter horizons prefer lower check-off ratio due to their inability
to capture the research benefits in the future. Given these heterogeneous preferences over the
check-off ratio, the choice of the check-off ratio makes some group members better off while
imposing a cost on other group members. An investigation of the conflicts that exist among group
members is a subject for further research.
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3.10 Appendix
The estimated values of Aˆ for different lag distributions under different treatments of IRR and
gestation lag g can be seen in Figure 3.10. Where Aˆ is the estimated value of the parameter A in
the Cobb-Douglas production function that ensures that a one percent check-off levy generates
an internal rate of return equal to IRR. And Aˆ can be solved for using equation (3.28).
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Chapter 4. A Model of The World Pulse Market
Chapter 4
A Model of The World Pulse Market
4.1 Introduction
To examine the economic impacts of Canadian producer-funded R&D, the study develops a
multi-region, multi-product partial equilibrium model of the world pulse market. Based on the
evidence in Chapter 2, the model is divided into seven regions with Canada as the single pulse
exporter and other regions as importers.
These seven regions are: Canada (c), India (i), China (h), Bangladesh (b), Turkey (t), the
European Union (e), and the ROW (r). The model focuses on four crops: peas, lentils, wheat and
canola. With this regional division, the impact of an increase in Canadian pea R&D investment
can be determined on a region-by-region basis. In addition to capturing the international trade
linkages, the model incorporates the relationship among peas, lentils, wheat and canola in both
production and consumption within Canada.
To analyze the economic impacts of Canadian pulse innovation, it is necessary to specify
the functional form of the behavioural functions and the appropriate spatial trade model. In
this chapter, the demand functions are derived from indirect utility functions, while the supply
functions are derived from indirect profit functions. The use of indirect utility and profit functions
allows the calculation of changes in the economic surplus caused by increased Canadian pea
R&D investment. Once the supply and demand curves are specified, the partial equilibrium trade
model is constructed.
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The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 derives the demand functions for all seven
regions (Canada, India, China, Bangladesh, Turkey, the European Union, and the ROW). Section
4.3 presents the derivation of supply functions in each region. Section 4.4 derives the function of
economic surplus based on the indirect utility function and the indirect profit function. At last,
the partial equilibrium model is presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Derivation of Demand Functions
Suppose there are n (n ≤ 5) commodities (e.g., peas, lentils, wheat, and canola) and an aggregate
good g in country s. Denoting the price of the aggregate good Pgs as the numèraire price, then
the normalized price for good j is pjs = Pjs/Pgs (j = 1, 2, ..., n), and the normalized income






gs = ms, where Q
d
js is
the demand for commodity j in country s. The indirect utility function can be derived from the
following system of integrability equations:
∂µ(p; q,m)
∂pi
= xi(p, µ(p; q,m)) i = 1, . . . , q
µ(q; q,m) = m
(4.1)
where µ(·) is the money metric indirect utility function, q and p are vectors for different prices
(the detailed derivation is captured in Appendix A.2).
This study assumes the indirect utility function is Quasilinear. Thus, the demand function
for crop j in country s, i.e., Qdjs(p,m) can be specified as:
Qdjs = ajs + bjspjs + bjispis
Qdis = ais + bispis + bijspjs
(4.2)






⇒ bjis = bijs = bs
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Therefore, equation (4.2) can be rewritten as:
Qdjs = ajs + bjspjs + bspis
Qdis = ais + bispis + bspjs
(4.3)
The negative semidefiniteness of the Hessian matrix implies bjs < 0, bis < 0, and bjsbis−b2s > 0.
Under the assumption that Pgs = 1, the demand function for crop j of importing country s
is:
Qdjs = ajs + bjsPjs + bsPis (4.4)
Because both peas and lentils are used as food in importing countries such as India, China, and
Bangladesh, the demand for peas (lentils) is also affected by the price of lentils (peas).
In Canada, the cross-price term between peas and lentils is zero, since peas are used for feed
and lentils are used for food. Thus, the market demand function for commodity j in Canada is:
Qdjc = ajc + bjcPjc (4.5)
The detailed derivation of the demand functions expressed in elasticity form is shown in Appendix
A.1.
4.3 Derivation of Supply Functions
To derive the supply functions, this study starts from a multi-product primal model. Suppose, in
any one country, the production of crop j can be defined as
yj = f
j(xj, Lj, K¯j), j = peas, lentils, wheat, and canola,∑
j Lj = L¯
(4.6)
where f(·) is a strictly concave production function, and xj is the quantity of aggregate conven-
tional variable inputs such as labor, machinery, and capital. Let Lj be the quantity of land used
in the production of j, and L¯ the quantity of total productive units of land. Because land is fixed
but allocatable, the total quantity of land L¯ is fixed, whileLj is adjustable among different crops.
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Let K¯j represent the knowledge stock of agricultural production for crop j. It is fixed in any
given year because it depends on the historical R&D investment and is not affected by current




ωsEj(t−s) ∀ t ∈ [1, LR] (4.7)
where ω is a vector of the lag weight, LR is the overall time length that current R&D can affect
the knowledge stock; parameter s is the number of years since the initial R&D investment.
For simplicity, assume that all check-off revenues are used as the R&D investment, thus R&D
expenditures Et equals check-off revenues in any given year.
Canadian crop producers are price takers in the input and output markets. The objective of






Pj(1− lj)f j(xj, Lj, K¯j)− Pxxj s.t.
∑
j
Lj = L¯ (4.8)
where j represents one individual crop, i.e., j = (peas, lentils, wheat, canola), under the assump-
tion of only four major crops in the country. For any particular crop j, Pj is the output price,
Pj(1 − lj) is the net output price after the check-off is paid, and Px the price of the aggregate
conventional input. Let K¯j = (K¯p, K¯l, K¯w, K¯c) be the knowledge stock for peas, lentils, wheat
and canola respectively, and l¯j = (l¯p, l¯l, l¯w, l¯c) be the check-off ratio for these four crops re-










Solutions to MaxL in terms of xj , Lj , and λ can be obtained by first-order conditions, i.e.,
Lxj = Pj(1− lj)f jxj(xj, Lj, K¯j)− Px = 0 (4.9a)
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Lj = 0 (4.9c)
Solving the first-order conditions simultaneously gives the input demand and output supply
functions which are functionally related to all output prices, variable input prices, and total
available quantity of the fixed or exogenous input – land and knowledge stock. Therefore,
x∗j = x
∗
j(P (1− l), Px, L¯, K¯) (4.10a)
L∗j = L
∗
j(P (1− l), Px, L¯, K¯) (4.10b)
λ∗ = λ∗(P (1− l), Px, L¯, K¯) (4.10c)
whereP = (Pp, Pl, Pw, Pc) is a vector of output prices, l = (lp, ll, lw, lc) is a vector of check-off
ratio, and K¯ = (K¯p, K¯l, K¯w, K¯c) is a vector of knowledge stock. Equation (4.10a) is the demand
function for the aggregate conventional input, and equation (4.10b) is the input demand for land
used for each individual crop. Under the assumption of a concave production function, the
second-order sufficient conditions are satisfied, and land exhibits diminishing marginal product,
decreasing its marginal value as more land is employed. Input demand functions are functions
of all exogenous variables such as input output prices, check-off ratio, total amount of land, and
the knowledge stock. The cost of land is endogenously determined by the shadow value of the
land constraint in the model.
Substituting equations (4.10a) and (4.10b) into the production function (equation 4.6) gives
the output supply for each crop as:
y∗j = y
∗
j (P (1− l), Px, L¯, K¯) (4.11)
Substituting the input demand and output supply functions into the profit function (4.8) gives
the indirect profit function as
Π∗ = Π∗(P (1− l), Px, L¯, K¯) (4.12)
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Functional Form of The Indirect Profit Function
Following Shumway et al. [1987] and Huffman and Evenson [1989], a normalized quadratic
indirect profit function is used to derive a set of linear supply functions. The indirect profit
function shows the profits of a farmer that produces four crops – peas, lentils, wheat, and canola.
Assuming that the price of the aggregate conventional input is Px, the normalized net output
prices can be specified as pj = (Pj/Px), (j = 1, ..., 4). Thus, the normalized indirect profit
function can be written as pi = g(p(1 − l), L¯, K¯), where p is a vector of normalized output
prices. Assuming a quadratic form, the normalized indirect profit function can be specified as:



























where zn (n = 1..., 5) is a vector of fixed inputs of L¯, K¯p, K¯l, K¯w, K¯c respectively. The linear
output supply functions of crop j can be derived from equation (4.13) using Hotelling’s Lemma,
i.e.,






ρjnzn j = 1, ..., 4 (4.14)
Because the indirect profit function is twice continuous differentiable and its partial derivatives
are invariant to the order of the differentiation, the slope of the supply functions are such that
βij = βji (i 6= j; i, j = 1, ..., 4).
The convexity of the indirect profit function with respect to prices means that βij > 0,
(i = j; i, j = 1, ..., 4), which indicates that the own price elasticity j is positive. The sign of
the coefficient on the cross term of the price, i.e., βij , is determined by the cross price elasticity
ij . With a fixed amount of land, the four specified crops are substitutes because more land used
for growing one crop reduces the land allocated to other crops. Therefore, ij < 0 (i 6= j), and
hence βij < 0 (i 6= j).
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In equation (4.14), because L¯, K¯l, K¯w, and K¯c are fixed, for simplicity, they can be subsumed
into the constant term, i.e., αj = φj + ρj1L¯ + ρj3K¯l + ρj4K¯w + ρj5K¯c. Therefore, under the
assumption that Px = 1, the output supply function for crop j in Canada can be derived as:
Qsjc = αjc +
4∑
i=1
βjicPic(1− li) + ρjpcK¯pc (4.15)
where Pic is the output price in Canada. The sign and magnitude of ρjpcK¯pc determines how pea
R&D investment affects the supply functions of the other crops in Canada; this will be discussed
in section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5 .
The indirect profit function approach can also be used to determine the output supply func-
tions in importing country s for crop j, i.e.,




where subscript s represents the importing country, and k is the number of crops planted in
the importing country. The difference between equation (4.15) and equation 4.16 is that pea
production in the importing countries is not affected by the knowledge stock; this specification
reflects the assumption that the development of new varieties in Canada does not affect the yield
in the importing countries.
The responsiveness of the output supply to changes in prices can be interpreted in elasticities,
and the detailed derivation is included in the Appendix A.1. Equation (4.15) and (4.16) will be
used to form the partial equilibrium model in the later part of this chapter.
4.4 Derivation of Economic Surplus
4.4.1 Consumer Surplus
When the utility function is Quasilinear, changes in consumer surplus can be used to provide
an accurate measure of the welfare change resulting from price changes – i.e., the change in
consumer surplus is equal to both the compensating variation and the equivalent variation (Varian
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[1992], p163). The change in consumer surplus in country s can be calculated as follows (the
detailed derivation is presented in Appendix A.3):
∆CSs = µ(qs;p1s,ms)− µ(qs;p0s,ms)







Under the assumption that Pgs = 1, equation (4.17) can be rewritten as:





ls − P 2als)
(4.18)
where P a·s is the equilibrium price after the change in R&D investment and P ·s is the initial
equilibrium price before the change in R&D investment.
In the case of Canada, the change in consumer surplus in Canada is:
∆CSc = µc(p0c ;p
1
c ,mc)− µc(p0c ;p0c ,mc)
= apc(ppc − papc)− 12bpc(p2pc − p2apc) + alc(plc − palc)− 12blc(p2lc − p2alc)
+awc(pwc − pawc)− 12bwc(p2wc − p2awc) + acc(pcc − pacc)− 12bcc(p2cc − p2acc)
(4.19)
Under the assumption that Pgc = 1 and that the prices for wheat and canola are fixed (Canada is
assumed to be a small country in the wheat and canola markets), equation (4.19) can be rewritten
as:









lc − P 2alc) (4.20)
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4.4.2 Producer Surplus
The change in producer surplus in the case of multiple outputs is calculated as the difference in
the normalized indirect profit function after and before the increase in pea R&D investment. For
Canada, the change in producer surplus is:




























ρjnc(pajc(1− lajc)zanc − pjc(1− ljc)znc)
(4.21)
where pi(pc) and pi(pac) represent, respectively, the producer surplus before and after an increase
in pea R&D investment, pajc is the vector of equilibrium prices after the increase in pea R&D
investment, z·c is the fixed factor before the R&D, and za·c is the fixed factor after the R&D.
Because the fixed factors and the knowledge stock in the importing countries remain un-
changed (and assuming Px = 1), the change in producer surplus in country s is:
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4.5 The Partial Equilibrium Model
Using equations (4.5), (4.4), (4.15), and (4.16), the multi-region, multi-product partial equilib-
rium model (PEM) can be specified as:
Qdjc = ajc + bjcPjc
Qdjs = ajs + bjsPjs + bsPis
Qsjc = αjc +
∑4
i=1 βjicPic(1− li) + ρjpcK¯pc














Pjs = Pjc + τjs
(4.23)
where j indicates the crop (peas, lentils, wheat, and canola), s represents the importing countries
(India, China, Bangladesh, Turkey, EU, and ROW), c represents Canada, and τ is a spatial
price differential that captures the transportation costs and trade policy distortions. The first two
equations are the demand functions for Canada and other importing countries, respectively; the
third and fourth equations are the supply functions for Canada and the importing countries; the
fifth equation is the world market equilibrium condition for crop j; and the last equation captures
the transportation costs and trade policy distortions. The detailed mathematical derivation for
the partial equilibrium model is derived in Appendix A.4.
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4.6 The Dynamic Partial Equilibrium Model
The dynamic partial equilibrium model is specified when market clears in each time period with
the change of the knowledge stock caused by the change of R&D investment. Thus, in any given
period t, the multi-region, multi-product dynamic partial equilibrium model can be derived as:
Qdjct = ajc + bjcPjct
Qdjst = ajs + bjsPjst + bsPist
Qsjct = αjc +
∑4
i=1 βjicPict(1− li) + ρjpcK¯pct














Pjst = Pjct + τjst
(4.24)
where the subscript t represents time period. For simplicity, this study assumes that the elasticities
for the short-run and long-run are the same.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter developed two models: a multi-region, multi-product partial equilibrium model, and
a dynamic partial equilibrium model. The models capture the economic impacts of a change in
the current check-off ratio for Canadian pea R&D investment on different regions and different
group of agents (producers and consumers).
The linear demand functions are derived from a well-behaved indirect utility function – the
normalized quasi-linear function. While the linear supply functions are derived from a normalized
quadratic indirect profit function that satisfies the economic properties. Based on the derived
demand and supply functions for each region, a partial equilibrium model is developed to capture
the world pulse trade conditions. Thereafter, a dynamic partial equilibrium model is developed to
calculate the IRR to Canadian producers. The dynamic model provides a theoretical background
for the empirical calibration in the next chapter. The detailed empirical analysis of welfare and
production effects caused by the increase of Canadian pea R&D investment can be seen in the
following chapter.
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The analysis in this chapter is based on the assumption of no spillovers across levy programs.
This assumption can be relaxed in further studies, where producers of other crops can free-ride
the benefits generated by pulse producers’ R&D investment. A new model can be developed to
show how the spillover issue can affect the research benefit to pulse growers, hence their R&D
investment decisions.
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Chapter 5
The Returns of Canadian Producer-Funded R&D
5.1 Introduction
Producer check-offs are an important source of agricultural R&D funding that can be used to
address the shortfalls of declining public funding and incomplete intellectual property rights
for private funding. Producer funding provides direct benefits to producers through applied
agricultural research such as disease management, genetic improvement, and weed control.
Moreover, producer levies are an efficient way to fund agricultural R&D because taxing producers
directly costs the society less than taxing the general population [Alston et al., 2004].
Examples of producer involvement in R&D funding can be found in Australia and Canada.
In Australia, the Australian Grain Research and Development Corporation (GRDC) is funded
by a mandatory non-refundable levy of 0.99 percent of the farm value matched by a maximum
0.5 percent of government funding. In wheat, for instance, basic science research is funded by
the GRDC, while variety development is funded by private-public partnerships that raise funds
through an End Point Royalty (EPR) collected on new varieties.
In Canada, a number of different sectors have established check-offs to fund R&D. For
instance, the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers (SPG) uses a mandatory non-refundable levy of one
percent of the gross sales value that is deducted at the first point of sale. Farmers who pay the
check-off are automatically enrolled as registered SPG members and given the right to vote for
the SPG board.
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As one of the major crops of western Canada, pulses have been widely planted by prairie
farmers due to the need for crop rotation. As well, the R&D investment of Canadian pulse industry
has dramatically increased from $Cdn 1.02 million in 2002 to $Cdn 6.11 million in 2012 (both
figures in nominal terms) [SPG, 2013]. Given that Canada is the largest pulse exporter in the
world, as discussed in chapter 2, such an increase in R&D investment can be expected to have
a significant impact on international trade and overseas producers and consumers. Therefore,
an important question is who benefits from the research benefits, and who bears the cost. How
would the allocation of research benefits and costs influence the R&D investment decisions.
5.2 Research Objectives
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically examine the distribution of R&D benefits and
costs between producers and consumers in Canada and its trading partners, and then to use
these results to determine the internal rate of return of R&D expenditures made by Canadian
producers. Specifically, the study examines how the economic returns to buyers and sellers in the
world are affected by R&D investment in Canada. Examining the global impacts is becoming
increasingly important as issues of food security receive greater attention [Rosegrant et al., 2013].
For instance, while R&D is beneficial for Canadian pulse growers, it is important to determine
its impact on farmers in the developing countries that are the largest purchasers of pulses grown
in Canada. The results of this chapter are also used to determine the IRR obtained by Canadian
farmers that invest in pulse research, and how this IRR is affected by the horizon problem.
This study explicitly specifies the linkage among the check-off ratio, R&D investment, and
knowledge stock. The study also captures the lagged R&D benefits that over a number of periods
as a result of an increase in investment.
To undertake this analysis, it is necessary to choose a particular crop, since the answers to
the questions posed above are expected to differ depending on the characteristics of the crop in
question (e.g., degree of export exposure, importance in the world market, elasticities of demand
and supply). Peas are selected for the analysis because Canada is the largest exporter of peas in
the world. As a result, the added production from agricultural R&D investment will necessarily
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affect the world price and thus the economic surplus of both domestic and foreign consumers
and producers.
The research will be carried on in the following steps. First, the study examines the impact of
an increase in Canadian pea R&D investment on prices and quantities in Canada and around the
world. Second, the study examines the impact of agricultural R&D on the distribution of producer
and consumer surplus in various regions. Third, knowledge of the economic surplus changes on
Canadian producers is used to determine the rate of return to R&D funding decisions. Fourth,
the sensitivity analysis is conducted to compare the impact on IRR to Canadian producers in the
case of small country versus large country. Fifth, the horizon problem is re-examined under the
condition of multi-product Canadian farmers in an open economy.
To examine the above impacts the study develops a multi-region, multi-product partial equi-
librium model of the world pulse industry. In addition to capturing the international trade link-
ages, the model incorporates the relationship among peas, lentils, wheat, and canola in production
within Canada. In the model, an increase in R&D investment has a lagged impact on the knowl-
edge stock that lasts over a number of periods.
An important assumption of the analysis is that there are no spatial knowledge spillovers
across territories. This assumption is made because Canadian technology is not usually applicable
to importing regions, such as Asia and EU, due to the very different geographical conditions
present in those regions. In addition, we also assume no spatial knowledge spillovers among
provinces in Canada. According to the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers Annual Report, more than
90 percent of Canadian pulses are produced in Saskatchewan (Saskatchewan Pulse Growers
Annual Report). Thus, the model effectively assumes that all Canadian production comes from
Saskatchewan.
5.3 A Framework for The Analysis
The analysis starts by constructing a multi-region, multi-product partial equilibrium model that
captures the market connections between different crops and different regions over time. To
examine the economic impacts of Canadian pea innovation, the model is divided into seven
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regions (Canada, India, China, Bangladesh, Turkey, EU, and ROW), and focused on four crops


















Figure 5.1: Changes in Knowledge Stock and Check-Off Ratio for The Dynamic PEM
Source: Developed by the author.
As Figure 5.1 shows, this study assumes the check-off ratio increases from lp to l′p at period
t = 0 and it then returns to the original level lp at period t = 1 and all remaining periods. The
marginal costs MC0 of a change of the check-off ratio occurs in period t = 0, while the marginal
benefits MBt occur in period t ∈ [1, LR] under the assumption of a zero gestation lag.
The specification of this model examines the case of a pivotal supply shift that generates the
R&D cost and a parallel supply shift that generates the R&D benefit. The pivotal supply shift
for R&D cost is because the check-off is collected as a percentage of total sales. The parallel
supply shift as a result of R&D expenditure follows the standard modelling of R&D – see, for
instance, Alston et al. [2004]. The pattern of the supply shift and the simulation results will be
discussed in depth in Section 5.5.
The marginal costs MC0 and marginal benefits MBt in each period are determined through the
partial equilibrium trade model. The net impact of the change in the check-off ratio on Canadian
producers is derived as the net present value of producer surplus with increased check-off ratio
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(PS′t) minus the NPV of producer surplus with unchanged current check-off ratio (PSt), i.e.,
NPV(PS′t − PSt). The benchmark for all calculations is the market equilibrium condition with
unchanged check-off ratio.





t − PSt)/(1 + IRR)t = 0, where LR is the total lag length for research. However,





t − PSt)/(1 + IRRh)t = 0, where T is the membership horizon. A comparison of
IRRh with IRR determines the significance of the horizon problem.
1. Calibrate demand and supply functions by using data from FAOSTAT and
existing literatures.
2. Solve the equilibrium prices and quantities by using the partial equilibrium
model
3. Shock the system by increasing 10% of R&D investment of pea sector in
Canada.
4. Solve the new equilibrium prices and quantities.
5. Examine three effects:
(1) Effects on prices;
(2) Effects on production;
(3) Effects on economic surplus.
6. Calculate the internal rate of return with a 10% increase in R&D investment
by using the dynamic partial equilibrium model.
8. Re-examine the horizon problem for multi-product Canadian farmers in the case 
of large country and small country.
7. Sensitivity analysis of impacts of cross knowledge elasticities and cross
demand elasticities on IRR.
Figure 5.2: Research Framework
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As Figure 5.2 shows, this study first calibrates the demand and supply functions, based
on the theoretical model in Chapter 4, by using price and quantity data from FAOSTAT, and
elasticities from the existing literature. Once the behavioural functions are calibrated, the model
is solved for the equilibrium prices and quantities in different regions and for different crops.
The worldwide impact of an increase in Canadian R&D spending on peas is then examined by
shocking the system with a 10 percent increase in the R&D investment by the Canadian pea
industry. Based on this shock, new market equilibrium outcomes for the following 50 years are
determined. The new equilibria allow the comparative analysis of the change in prices, demand
and supply quantities, and economic surplus to be carried out. Using the producer surplus changes
for Canadian farmers, the internal rate of return is calculated. A sensitivity analysis is conducted
to compare the impact on IRR to Canadian producers by adjusting the baseline values of the
key parameters in the model, such as the cross knowledge elasticities, overseas cross demand
elasticities, and demand elasticity for peas and lentils for the large country case and small country
case respectively. Finally, the horizon problem is re-examined in the case of large country and
small country respectively.
5.4 Simulation of The Effects of Canadian Producer-Funded R&D
5.4.1 The Simulation Procedure
The simulation procedure is captured in Figure 5.3 with the international trade market linkages
for peas. Figure 5.3 only illustrates the pea market. In the simulation model, four markets – peas,
lentils, wheat, and canola – are considered, as well as the feedbacks among these markets. The
Canadian pea market is depicted in panel (a) and the pea markets in the importing countries are
depicted in panel (c).
In panel (a), S is the supply curve for Canadian peas prior to the introduction of a checkoff
and Spc is the supply with the current check-off ratio of one percent of total revenue. The pivotal
shift from S to Spc occurs because the check-off is collected as a percentage of total sales.
With a one percent check-off ratio, the market price is Ppc and EQ amount of peas are
exported to other countries. Given a one percent check-off ratio, the post-levy producer surplus
is the area E0GPpc and the R&D investment is the purple area E0FKPpc.
80
Chapter 5. The Returns of Canadian Producer-Funded R&D
Suppose the R&D investment increases by 10 percent (this is equivalent to a 10 percent
increase in the knowledge stock). To get this increase in R&D investment requires an increase in
the check-off ratio by more than 10 percent. With this increase in the check-off ratio, the supply
curve shifts from Spc to S′pc. The new R&D investment is represented by the green area CBIP
′
pc; it
is ten percent larger than the purple area. With this increased R&D investment, the market price
increases from Ppc to P ′pc, and ∆Q amount of peas will be exported. The increased market price
means that consumers (both domestic and overseas) bear a portion of the R&D costs as well.
The cost to Canadian producers of making this research investment is the loss of the producer
surplus after the increase of the check-off ratio, i.e., area CDP′pc minus area E0GPpc.
As Figure 5.1 shows, the check-off ratio increases only at period t = 0; after t = 0, the supply
curve shifts back from S′pc to Spc. The larger R&D investment results in higher productivity and
causes a parallel shift of the supply curve from Spc to S′′pc. The new market equilibrium price is
P ′′pc and EQ
′′ peas are exported. At the new equilibrium, the producer surplus is the area E1JP′′pc.
The net R&D benefit to Canadian producers is the difference in the producer surplus before and
after the increase R&D investment, i.e., area E1JP′′pc minus area E0GPpc.
Panel (b) represents the traded quantities, where EDp represents the excess demand from
the importing countries and EDpc is the excess demand at the Canadian port faced by Canadian
producers. The difference between EDp and EDpc is the transportation cost t from Canada to the
import market. As a result of the increased Canadian R&D investment, the excess supply curve
from Canada increases from ES′p to ES
′′
p in panel (b). The increased R&D results in the market
price in the importing country (panel (c)) falling from Ppc + t to P ′′pc + t; IQ
′′ peas are imported,
with EQ′′ = IQ′′. In terms of welfare, consumers in the importing countries gain area a + b,
while producers in the importing countries lose area a. The net gain of importing countries is
area b in panel (c).
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5.4.2 Data Description
Prices and Quantities of Demand and Supply
The price and quantity data used in this chapter are from FAOSTAT 2009. Table 5.1 reports the
baseline value of prices and quantities in each region for dry peas, lentils, wheat, and canola
respectively. The baseline prices for the model are the Canadian market prices for these four
crops, which are measured in $US per ton. Consumer prices in overseas regions are assumed to
be the importing price – i.e., the value of imports divided by the imported quantity.
Transportation Costs
Transportation costs and the possible effects of import policies are assumed to be captured by
τi, the spatial price differentials between the importing country i and Canada. The values of the
transportation costs are shown in Table 5.2. For instance, the transportation cost and import policy
wedge between Canada and India is represented as τi = Pi − Pc, where Pi is the market price
in India, and Pc is the market price in Canada. Furthermore, for simplicity, unit transportation
costs (and trade policy effects) are assumed to be on a per unit basis. The cost τi is assumed to
be constant in the model.
5.4.3 Specification of Key Parameters and Variables
The key parameters and variables in the model are lag weight distribution, price elasticities,
knowledge stock, and knowledge elasticities.
Lag Weight Distribution
As Chapter 3 indicates, the parameters of the lag weight of research benefits are crucial in
determining the horizon IRR to producers within the limited membership horizon. Following
Alston et al. [2010], this analysis assumes the lag weights have a gamma distribution described
by parameters η and λ. Specifically, it is assumed that the lag weight for Canadian pulse crops
has η = 0.7 and λ = 0.85, with a peak year of 13 years (see figure 5.4).1 The maximum lag
length LR is assumed to be 50 years, while the gestation lag g = 0.
1The lag for pulse research is relatively short because it is applied research and its peak year is about nine to 15
years according to the conversation with the agronomist at the Crop Development Centre.
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Figure 5.4: Lag Weight Distribution
Source: Developed by the author according to Alston et al. [2010].
Price Elasticities
The slope and intercept parameters of the demand and supply functions in each region are
obtained from the local elasticities and the baseline price and quantity data from FAOSTAT
2009. Two relevant price elasticities used in this analysis are the own price elasticity of demand
and supply, and the cross price elasticity of supply and demand. The value of these elasticities
are provided in table 5.3.
Own Price Elasticity – As Table 5.3 shows, the price elasticities of demand and supply
used in the model are taken from the existing literature, such as Davis et al. [1987] and Meilke
et al. [2001]. Where elasticities were not available assumptions were made to provide them
reasonable values. For instance, the data of demand elasticities of pulses in Turkey and the ROW
are unavailable, and they were assumed to equal to the demand elasticities of Asian countries.
The same criteria is used to deal with the supply elasticities as well. The detailed parametric
specification can be seen in table 5.3.
Cross Price Elasticity – The cross price elasticities used in the model are taken from the
existing literature or are based on assumptions consistent with this literature. For instance,
values of cross price elasticities of peas and lentil for importing countries are assumed as 0.2
with India as an exception of 0.6. Such an assumption is made based on the Indian tradition of
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food consumption that peas and lentils have a relatively higher substitution effects than other
importing countries.
The symmetry of the Hessian matrix for the normalized quasi-linear utility function indicates
bij = bji. Therefore, the cross price demand elasticity of product j with respect to product i (ηji)
is linked to bij through the relationshiip ηji = bij PiQdj
. On the supply side, the normalized quadratic
profit function is twice continuous differentiable and according to Young’s Theorem, βij = βji.
Therefore, the cross price supply elasticity of product j with respect to product i (ηji) is linked to
βij through the relationshiip ji = βij PiQsj . The values of the cross price elasticities are presented
in table 5.3.
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Table 5.1: Initial Values of Prices, Quantities, and Knowledge Stock in The Model
Canada India China Bangladesh Turkey EU ROW
Price US dollars per tonne
Dry peas 198.39 323.74 295.01 277.62 1142.30 408.97 521.81
(Ppc) (Ppi) (Pph) (Ppb) (Ppt) (Ppe) (Ppr)
Lentils 595.61 776.49 415.37 980.84 943.32 1,043.46 898.35
(Plc) (Pli) (Plh) (Plb) (Plt) (Ple) (Plr)
Wheat 211.58 – – – – – –
(Pwc)
Canola 411.52 – – – – – –
(Pcc)
Demand Quantity thousands of tonnes




























Wheat 7,320 – – – – – –
(Qdwc)
Canola 4,938 – – – – – –
(Qdcc)
Supply Quantity thousands of tonnes




























Wheat 26,848 – – – – – –
(Qswc)
Canola 12,889 – – – – – –
(Qscc)
Knowledge Stock1 US dollars
6,703,510 – – – – – –
(Kpc)
Source: FAOSTAT 2009.
1Calculated according to equation (5.1).
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Table 5.2: Transportation Costs and Exchange Rate
Canada India China Bangladesh Turkey EU ROW
US dollars
Transportation Costs & Policy Effects1
Dry Peas – 125.36 96.62 79.23 943.91 210.58 323.42
(tpi) (tph) (tpb) (tpt) (tpe) (tpr)
Lentils - 180.88 -180.23 385.24 347.72 447.85 302.75
(tli) (tlh) (tlb) (tlt) (tle) (tlr)
Exchange Rate2 0.88 – – – – – –
Source: 1Calculated as the spatial price difference based on the data from FAOSTAT 2009.
2CAD/US$, Bank of Canada 2009.
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Chapter 5. The Returns of Canadian Producer-Funded R&D
Knowledge Stock
As discussed in Chapter 4, an important issue in determining the impact of pea R&D investment
on the supply functions is to determine the sign and magnitude of ρjpcK¯pc in equation (4.15).
The knowledge stock of peas, Kpc, can be derived as the weighted average of historical R&D
investment as equation (4.7) shows. This study assumes a base case with constant R&D invest-
ment in each and every year, i.e., E0 = E1 = E2 = ... = ELR = E. Therefore, equation (4.7)







s=1 ωs = 1, equation (5.1) can be rewritten as
Kpct = E = lpPQ (5.2)
Using the price and quantity data from FAOSTAT 2009 for P and Q, and the current check-
off ratio lp of 1%, the calculated value of the knowledge stock is presented in Table 5.1. This
calculated knowledge stock is treated as the benchmark value in the analysis.
A rise in R&D investment by an amount ∆E in period t = 0 (and only period t = 0) results




ωsE(t−s) = E + ωt∆E = lpP ∗Q∗ + ωt(l′pP0Q0 − lpP ∗Q∗) (5.3)
The numerical value of Kpct in equation 5.3 is calculated using the data P ∗ and Q∗ calibrated
from the model; the initial check-off ratio lp is one percent; the increased check-off ratio l′p is
1.1 percent that leads to 10 percent increase in R&D investment; and the equilibrium solutions
from the partial equilibrium model at t = 0 give P0 and Q0. The calculated historical values of
the knowledge stock can be seen in figure 5.5 panel (b).
The dynamic change of the check-off ratio, R&D investment, and the knowledge stock can
be seen in table 5.4. Before period t = 0, the check-off ratio is constant at lp, the market clears
at (P ∗, Q∗), R&D investment is E¯, and the knowledge stock is K¯p. This equilibrium outcome
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holds until the check-off ratio increases from lp to l′p at t = 0. Under the assumption that the
check-off ratio changes from lp to l′p at period t = 0 and the check-off ratio then returns to the
original level lp in period t = 1 and all remaining periods, Kpt is determined by the product of
ωt and ∆E, where ∆E = E0 − E¯.
Table 5.4: Dynamic Change of the Check-off Ratio, R&D Investment, and Knowledge Stock
Time Levy Ratio R&D Invest. Knowledge Stock
(t) lp P ∗ Q∗ (E) (Kpt)






































ωsE(1−s) = E¯ + ω1∆E





























ωsE(50−s) = E¯ + ω50∆E
Source: Developed by the author.
Elasticities of the Knowledge Stock
According to equation (4.15), the other factor that affects the magnitude of the impact of knowl-
edge stock on supply is the coefficient ρjpc. This coefficient can be determined by the elasticities
of the knowledge stock. Two knowledge elasticities are of concern: the own knowledge elasticity
represented by θjpc (j = pea), and the cross knowledge elasticity represented by θjpc (j 6= pea).
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Own Knowledge Elasticity – The own knowledge elasticity is the percentage change of







where Qspc is the output supply of Canadian peas, and Kpc is the knowledge stock of peas in
Canada.
To isolate the effect of the pea knowledge stock on pea production, the own knowledge
elasticity is derived under the assumption that Canada is a small-country exporter of pulses (by
assuming a small country case, all price impacts are eliminated from the analysis). With a 10
percent increase in pea R&D investment, Kpc increases by approximately 10 percent. Since the
denominator in equation (5.4) is known, once the percentage change in Qspc is known, the value
of θpc can be obtained.
A reasonable value for the own knowledge stock elasticity is 0.987 that is just a bit less than
unitary implying that a 10 percent increase in the knowledge stock would result in an increase
in output that is just a bit less than 10 percent.
Cross Knowledge Elasticity – The cross knowledge elasticity is the percentage change of








The existence of the influence ofKpc on the supply of other crops is because the jointness of the
production of peas, lentils, wheat, and canola on a fixed amount of land. The impact of Kpc on
supply of other crops can be examined through the lens of acreage allocation among these four
crops.
The knowledge stock of peas negatively affects the output for the other crops because with
an increased knowledge stock Kpc, the opportunity cost of growing other crops increases. Con-
sequently, farmers shift some of their production away from other crops and towards peas.
Therefore, the cross knowledge elasticity is negative, i.e., θji < 0.
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Since wheat and canola are part of the same rotation as peas, it is reasonable to assume
the cross knowledge elasticity of wheat equals to the cross knowledge elasticity of canola, i.e.,
θwpc = θcpc. Since peas and lentils are not grown on the same type of land – peas are suitable for
drier areas and lentils for more moist areas – the cross knowledge elasticity of lentils should be
smaller than the one of wheat and canola, i.e., θlpc < θwpc = θcpc.
For a given value of θpc = 0.987, the base values of cross knowledge elasticities are solved as
the one gives a reasonable IRR of 57.66 percent that is the closest value to the previous estimation
of 58.6 percent by Alston et al. [2000]. The base values of the own knowledge elasticity and
cross knowledge elasticities can be seen in table 5.3.
5.4.4 Results and Implications
The parameters and variables specified above are used to examine the dynamic impact on prices,
production, and economic surplus in Canada and other regions arising from the increase of
Canadian pea R&D investment.
Relationship Between Knowledge Stock and Producer Surplus in Canada
The relationship between the lag weight, the knowledge stock, and producer surplus can be seen
in figure 5.5. In each panel of the graph, the horizontal axis shows the number of years from the
increase in the R&D investment (recall that the increase in investment is ∆E). In panel (a), the
value on the vertical axis is the weight ∆E receives t years after it has occurred. In panel (b), the
value on the vertical axis is the knowledge stock that ∆E generates t years after it has occurred.
The knowledge stock in the case of no increase in R&D investment, i.e., ∆E = 0, is depicted
as the flat dashed line. In panel (c), the value on the vertical axis is the change of the producer
surplus to Canadian farmers caused by ∆E. Since ∆E occurs only at t = 0 and then returns to
zero for all the remaining periods, its impact on the knowledge stock and the producer surplus
is determined by the lag weight distribution.
It is obvious that the lag weight, knowledge stock, and producer surplus are inexorably linked.
The impact of ∆E on the knowledge stock and the producer surplus is very small for the first
few years, increases for several years, and then eventually declines as the effect of the investment
on knowledge stock diminishes.
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Figure 5.5: Lag Weights, Knowledge Stock and ∆PS of Canada
Source: Developed by the author.
Effects on Production
A summary of the changes in the prices and quantities that are calculated in the simulation
model are presented in table 5.5. The pea price decreases in each region, which translates into
an increase in the quantity demanded of peas in each region. The quantity of peas supplied
increases in Canada, while it decreases in all importing countries. Since the increase in Canadian
pea production is larger than the reduction in pea production in importing countries, total world
pea production increases. The lentil price decreases. The quantity demanded of lentils increases
in Canada and decreases in the other importing countries with the exception of Bangladesh and
ROW; overall, total world lentil consumption decreases. The quantity of lentils supplied falls in
Canada and in the other regions, with the exception of China and the EU; overall, however, total
world lentil output decreases. The wheat and canola prices do not change given the assumption
that Canada is a price taker in these two markets. Wheat and canola production decline. A more
detailed analysis of the price and quantity effects is provided below.
Effects on Pea Production – The simulation results of the impact of increasing Canadian pea
R&D investment on pulse production is depicted in figure 5.6. As panel (a) illustrates, Canadian
pea production declines in period t = 0 due to the increase in R&D investment. Production then
starts to increase in period t = 1. The increment is very small for the first few years, increases
for several years, and then eventually declines as the effect of R&D diminishes.
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Canada - + + - + - nv - nv -
Other Regions - + - - - -
India - + - - - -
China - + - - - +
Bangladesh - + - - + -
Turkey - + - - - -
EU - + - - - +
ROW - + - - + -
World Total - + + - - -
Source: Developed by the author.
Notes: + represents positive effect caused by Canadian pea R&D investment;
- represents negative effect;
nv represents no variation;
Pea production in the importing countries increases in period t = 0 due to the higher price
for peas that results from the larger check-off ratio. Production then starts to decrease in period
t = 1. The decrease is very small for the first few years, gets larger for several years, and then
eventually falls as the effect of the R&D diminishes. Because the increase in Canadian pea
production is greater than the reduction in production in the importing countries, total world pea
output increases slightly in the first few years, increases for several years until it peaks, and then
falls as Canadian pea production declines.
There is an obvious inverse relationship between the pea production in Canada and the
aggregate production of other regions, i.e., the aggregate pea production increases when Canadian
pea production decreases, and it decreases when Canadian production increases. This inverse
relationship, under the assumption of no spatial knowledge spillovers between Canada and other
regions, is rooted in the price effect between the Canadian market and the other markets. The
increase in Canadian pea R&D investment results in a lower price for peas. As the pea price
falls, overseas pea production decreases. As Canadian pea R&D eventually loses its impact and
price begins to rise, overseas production increases with the decrease in Canadian pea production.
Therefore, it is appropriate to derive the following result:
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Figure 5.6: Effects on Pulse Production
Source: Developed by the author.
Result 5.1. With increased pea R&D investment, Canadian pea production increases while
overseas pea production declines. Since this increase in Canadian pea production is greater
than the reduction in overseas pea production, total world pea production increases.
Effects on Lentil Production – The simulation results of the impact of increasing Canadian
pea R&D investment on lentil production are depicted in figure 5.6 panel (b). As the figure shows,
lentil production in Canada and other regions decreases slightly for the first few years, decreases
more substantially for several years, and then eventually increases as the effect of Canadian pea
R&D diminishes. Consequently, the total world lentil production decreases as well.
The positive relationship between Canadian lentil production and aggregate lentil production
in other regions is determined through the interactions between the pea and lentil markets. With
the increase in pea R&D investment, the pea supply curve in Canada shifts out and the lentil
supply curve shifts inward. Therefore, more peas are produced, which lowers the price of peas,
while lentil output declines. The lower pea price generates more overseas demand for peas,
but less demand for lentils, as consumers shift their purchases to peas. The demand shift is
sufficiently large that it causes the price for lentils to fall. The result is a falling price for lentils
and a decrease in production, as the following discussion illustrates.
Given theses outcomes, it is reasonable to derive the following result:
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Result 5.2. With increased pea R&D investment in Canada, lentil production declines in both
Canada and the importing countries.
Effects on Wheat and Canola Production – The effects of the increase of Canadian pea
R&D investment on Canadian wheat production is illustrated in figure 5.7 panel (a). Wheat
production decreases slightly for the first few years, decreases more substantially for several
years, and then eventually increases as the effect of the Canadian pea R&D diminishes.
Under the assumption of an exogenous wheat price, the decreased wheat production is caused
by two factors: the increase of the pea knowledge stock; and the decrease in the price of peas and
lentils. To isolate the impact of the pea knowledge stock on wheat production it is first assumed
that Canada is a small-country exporter for peas and lentils. After this analysis is completed,
the model then considers the large-country exporter case. The small-country exporter case can
be seen in Figure 5.7 panel (b), while panel (a) presents the case of large-country exporter.
Comparing panel (a) and (b), it is obvious that in the large country case the decrease in the
production of wheat is less than in the small country case. This is because, in the small country
case, for a fixed amount of land the increase in pea R&D investment increases the opportunity
cost of growing wheat resulting in a reduction in wheat production. Unlike in the small country
case, Canada faces a downward sloping demand curve for pulses as a large-country exporter.
Higher pea R&D investment causes lower pulse prices leading to a little more acreage allocated to
wheat production. Therefore, the decrease of wheat production when Canada is the large-country
exporter is less than when it is the small-country exporter.
The effects of the increase of Canadian pea R&D investment on Canadian canola production
is illustrated in figure 5.7 panel (c). Canola production decreases slightly for the first few years,
decreases more substantially for several years, and then eventually increases as the effect of the
Canadian pea R&D diminishes.
Under the assumption of exogenous canola price the decreased canola production is caused
by two factors: the increase of pea knowledge stock; and the decrease in the price of peas and
lentils. To isolate the impact of pea knowledge stock on canola production an alternative situation
is developed in which Canada is a small-country exporter for peas and lentils, see figure 5.7 panel
(d). Comparing panel (c) and (d), it is obvious that in the large country case the decrease in the
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production of canola is less than in the small country case. This is because, in the small country
case, for a given a fixed amount of land the increase in pea R&D investment increases the
opportunity cost of growing canola resulting in the reduction in canola production. Unlike in the
small country case, Canada faces a downward sloping demand curve for pulses as a large-country
exporter. Higher pea R&D investment causes lower pulse prices leading to a little more acreage
allocated to canola production. Therefore, the decrease of canola production when Canada is a
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Figure 5.7: Effects on Canadian Wheat and Canola Production
Source: Developed by the author.
Effects on Prices
The simulation results of the impact of increasing Canadian pea R&D investment on pea and
lentil prices are depicted in figure 5.8. The pea price and the lentil price increase in period t = 0
because of the increased check-off ratio, then decrease in the periods following. The decrease
is very small for the first few years, then increases for several years, and then eventually falls as
the R&D loses its effectiveness.
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Figure 5.8: Effects on Pulse Prices
Source: Developed by the author.
The decrease in the pea price is caused by the outward shift of the Canadian pea supply
curve as a result of the increase in pea R&D investment. As was discussed above, the increase
in pea R&D leads to an upward shift of the Canadian lentil supply curve. In addition, because
peas and lentils are substitutes on the consumption side in the importing countries, the fall in the
pea price results in a fall in overseas lentil demand. This demand side impact is larger than the
supply side impact, with the result that lentil prices decrease. Therefore, given these outcomes,
it is reasonable to derive the following result:
Result 5.3. With increased Canadian pea R&D investment, pea prices and lentil prices decline.
Effects on Economic Surplus
The effects on economic surplus associated with a 10 percent increase in pea R&D investment
in the Canadian pea sector can be seen in figure 5.9. Panel (a) illustrates the change in producer
surplus and panel (b) the change in consumer surplus.
Effects on Producer Surplus – Although pea price falls, Canadian producers nevertheless
benefit from the increased R&D investment as a result of the lower production cost that accom-
panies the R&D. As figure 5.9 panel (a) shows, in period t = 0, Canadian producer surplus
decreases as a result of the increased check-off levy. Producer surplus starts to increase in period
t = 1 and continues to do so until it achieves its maximum value at year t = 13. It then declines
with the diminishing effects of R&D investment.
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Although Canadian producers benefit from the research activities they carry out, the overseas
producers are worse off, and total producer surplus at the world level decreases. Notably, there
is an inverse relationship between the change of Canadian producer surplus and the aggregate
producer surplus for other regions – i.e., when Canadian producer surplus decreases, overseas
producer surplus increases, while when Canadian producers are better off, overseas producers
are worse off.
This inverse relationship is caused by the lower pea price that results from the increased
Canadian pea R&D investment. Once Canadian R&D investment starts to generate benefits, the
pea price decreases, more Canadian peas are produced and exported. Under the assumption of
no spatial knowledge spillovers between Canada and other regions, overseas pea production
declines and producer surplus consequently decreases. Thus, the following result is reasonable:
Result 5.4. With the increased pea R&D investment in Canada, Canadian producers are better
off while overseas producers are worse off. Since this reduction in overseas producer surplus is
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Figure 5.9: Effects on Economic Surplus
Source: Developed by the author.
Effects on Consumer Surplus – Consumers, on the other hand, are better off with the
increased Canadian pea R&D investment as Figure 5.9 panel (b) shows. In period t = 0, consumer
surplus in Canada decreases caused by the higher consumer price as a result of the increase of
R&D investment. The consumer surplus starts to increase in period t = 1. The increase is very
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small for the fist few years, increases for several years, and then eventually decreases as the R&D
loses its effectiveness. Therefore, it is appropriate to derive the following result:
Result 5.5. Consumers in all regions are better off from the increase in Canadian pea R&D
investment.
Ranking of the Welfare Effects
The welfare gains and losses from the increase in Canadian producer-funded R&D investment
were examined in the previous sections. The simulation results concluded that Canadian pro-
ducers and consumers are better off, overseas consumers are better off while overseas producers
are worse off.
A question that naturally arises is the ranking of the benefits to different agents (consumers
and producers in Canada and overseas countries). Figure 5.10 shows the ranking of welfare
changes for different agents. Overseas consumers are the biggest beneficiaries of Canadian pea
R&D investment, followed by Canadian producers. The research benefits to Canadian consumers
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Figure 5.10: Ranking of Welfare Effects
Source: Developed by the author.
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5.5 Comparison of Current Results with Traditional Analysis
Alston et al. [2004] show that in the case of a parallel supply shift, producers have the same
incentive to invest in R&D if they are in a small open economy (SOE) or a large open economy
(LOE)). Alston et al. [2004] also analyze the case of a pivotal supply shift.
This thesis models a pivotal supply shift that generates the R&D cost and a parallel supply
shift that generates the R&D benefit; it also examines the effect of trade status (SOE versus LOE)
on farmers’ investment incentives in such a model. The pivotal supply shift in the case of R&D
cost is empirically important because percentage levies are used in the Canadian pulse industry.
Understanding how farmers’ investment incentives are influenced in this case may help to shed
light on the underinvestment in R&D.
In order to compare the results of the model in this thesis with that of Alston et al. [2004],
this study transforms the dynamic multi-product model into a single-product model with parallel
supply shifts generated both the costs and the benefits. The simulation results are presented in
Table 5.6.
The IRR to Canadian producers in the case of a single-product is presented in the first row
of Table 5.6. When the R&D cost is generated by a parallel supply shift, the IRR of 59 percent
in the SOE case is essentially the same as the IRR in the LOE case. This result is the same as
that of Alston et al. [2004] who find that farmers’ investment incentives are not affected by the
trade status in the case of a parallel supply shift.
However, when the R&D cost is generated by a pivotal supply shift, the IRR in the SOE is
80.09 percent, a value smaller than the IRR in the LOE case of 94.35 percent. On this basis, it
is reasonable to derive the following result:
Result 5.6. Producers have a greater incentive to invest in R&D in the LOE case than in the
SOE case when the costs are generated by a pivotal supply shift.
The detailed proof of this result is presented in Appendix A.5.
In the multi-product case, according to equation 4.15, the output supply of Canadian crops
are affected by three factors – the pea price (Ppc), lentil price (Plc), and the knowledge stock of
peas (Kpc). To isolate the price impact and the impact of Kpc, the IRR calculation is conducted
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Table 5.6: IRR for Single-Product and Multi-Product Models: Parallel vs Pivotal Supply Shift
Parallel Supply Shift Pivotal Supply Shift
Models and Parameters SOE LOE(p) LOE (p&l) SOE LOE(p) LOE(p&l)
percentage
Single-Product Model
58.84 59.24 – 80.09 94.35 –
Multi-Product Model
θij (ij = 0)
Base values × 0 58.84 59.24 59.26 80.09 94.35 101.63
Base values × 1/2 51.12 48.80 47.77 69.43 77.27 81.26
Base values 42.51 36.49 33.86 57.70 57.75 57.61
Base values × 3/2 32.38 19.59 12.65 44.14 32.15 23.46
ij (θij = 0)
Base values × 0 58.84 59.24 59.26 80.09 94.35 101.63
Base values × 1/2 58.84 59.24 57.39 80.09 94.35 96.12
Base values 58.84 59.24 55.39 80.09 94.35 90.60
Base values × 3/2 58.84 59.24 53.24 80.09 94.35 85.05
Source: Developed by the author.
Note:
1. “Parallel supply shift” and “pivotal supply shift” describe the pattern of the supply shift that generates the
R&D cost;
2. LOE (p) captures the case where Canada is a LOE for peas only, while LOE (p&l) captures the case where
Canada is a LOE for both peas and lentils;
3. θij is the cross knowledge elasticity that captures the impact of the pea knowledge stock on the production
of other crops;
4. ij is the cross supply elasticities of peas with other crops;
5. When the impact of θij on IRR is calculated, the value of ij is set equal to zero; similarly when the impact
of ij on IRR is calculated, the value of θij is set equal to zero. In all cases the demand elasticities are kept
at their base values.
in two scenarios: (1) the impact of the cross knowledge elasticities (θij) is examined by setting
the cross supply elasticities to zero (ij = 0); (2) the impact of cross supply elasticities (ij) is
examined by setting the cross knowledge elasticities to zero (θij = 0). The calibrated results are
presented in Table 5.6.
The second row of Table 5.6 shows that when the output supply of Canadian crops is only
affected by the knowledge stock of peas, i.e., θ 6= 0 and  = 0, the larger is the impact of Kpc,
the smaller is the IRR to Canadian producers regardless the trade status. In the parallel shift
case, when the cross knowledge elasticity is equal to zero, farmers’ investment incentives are
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not distorted by the trade status and the IRR is approximately equal to 59 percent in the SOE,
LOE (p), and LOE (p&l) cases. However, when the cross knowledge elasticities are not equal
to zero, the IRRs in the large exporter case are smaller than those in the SOE case. The ranking
of IRRs of different trade status is: IRRs in SOE > IRRs in LOE (p) > IRRs in LOE (p&l). In
the case of pivotal shift, i.e., row two to five of the last three columns in Table 5.6, when θij
are smaller than the base values, the IRRs in the large country case are greater than those in the
small country case. However, when θij are greater than or equal to the base values, the IRRs in
large country cases are smaller than those in the SOE.
The impact of the cross supply elasticities are presented in row six to nine in Table 5.6. Cross
supply elasticities (ij) do not affect the IRR in the SOE and LOE (p) cases for both the parallel
and pivotal shift. In fact, the cross supply elasticities only affect the LOE (p&l), with the IRR
decreasing as ij increases.
From the above analysis, it can be seen that the cross knowledge elasticity θij is a key
parameter in determining investment incentives. The next section will focus on the sensitivity
analysis for the multi-product pivotal shift model. In addition to the cross knowledge elasticities
and cross supply elasticities, the impact of cross demand elasticities and own demand elasticities
on IRRs will be conducted.
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis
To investigate the robustness of the results, a number of sensitivity analyses were conducted.
Since it is difficult to examine the impact of different parameter values on the full range of
outcomes examined above (e.g., prices, quantities, consumer and producer surplus), the focus is
on a single outcome, namely the IRR that would accrue to Canadian producers from the R&D
investment.
For comparison purposes the IRR is calculated for the base value of all the parameters and
for three alternative values. Each alternative value is applied to one of four sets of parameters:
(1) the cross knowledge elasticities θjpc (j 6= pea); (2) the demand elasticity for peas ηpi; (3) the
demand elasticity of lentils ηli, (4) the cross demand elasticities of peas and lentils in importing
countries ηpli. Thus, if the sensitivity analysis is done for the demand elasticity of peas, then the
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demand elasticities of peas in all countries would be changed at the same time while holding all
other parameters constant.
The base value of the parameters and their alternative values are presented in Table 5.7. The
first alternative value is base value times zero, the second alternative value is the base values
times one half, and the third alternative value is the base values times one and half.
The sensitivity analysis is carried out under the maintained assumption that Canada is a large
exporter of peas and lentils. To isolate the impact of the knowledge stock of peas on other crops,
the effects on IRR are also examined in that case in which Canada is a large-country exporter
of peas but a small-country exporter of lentils, and the case in which Canada is a small-country
exporter (i.e., the prices of lentils and peas are fixed).
Table 5.7: Base and Alternative Values of Parameters Used in Sensitivity Analysis
Prm. Base Value Alt. Value 1 Alt. Value 2 Alt. Value 3
θjpc {-0.0005, -0.025, -0.025 } BV×0 BV×12 BV×32
ηpli { 0.6, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2 } BV× 0 BV×12 BV×32
ηpi {-0.79, -0.75, -0.75, -0.75, -0.75, -0.78, -0.75 } BV×0 BV×12 BV×32
ηli {-0.79, -0.75, -0.75, -0.75, -0.75, -0.78, -0.75 } BV×0 BV×12 BV×32
Source: Developed by the author.
5.6.1 Effects of Cross Knowledge Elasticities on Canadian Producer IRR
The first four rows in Table 5.8 show how the IRR is affected by different values of the cross
knowledge elasticities. As the cross knowledge elasticities increase in absolute value, the knowl-
edge stock of peas has a greater negative impact on the production of other crops (wheat, canola,
lentils), and the IRR to Canadian producers decreases. Thus it is appropriate to derive the fol-
lowing result:
Result 5.7. The larger is the impact of pea innovation on other crop production, the smaller is
the R&D returns to Canadian producers.
The impact of the cross knowledge elasticities does differ depending on whether Canada is a
large or a small country. In the SOE case, the impact of different cross knowledge elasticities is
muted compared to what happens in the large country case. Most notably, larger absolute values
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of the cross knowledge elasticities have a significant impact on the IRR in the large country case,
with the IRR falling to 10.54 in the case where the cross crop impact is the largest.
5.6.2 Effects of Cross Demand Elasticities on Canadian Producer IRR
Table 5.8 also presents the effects of different cross demand elasticities on Canadian producer
IRR. As the cross demand elasticities increase, the IRR to Canadian producers decreases in the
case where Canada is the large country exporter for both peas and lentils. However, the cross
demand elasticities have no impact on the IRR if Canada is a LOE for peas only. Thus, the larger
is the substitution effect between the demand of peas and lentils, the smaller are the research
benefits to Canadian producers in the case of LOE (p&l).
The reason for this result is as follows. The higher are the cross demand elasticities of peas
and lentils, the greater is the inward shift of the lentil demand curve in response to a drop in the
pea price, and the lower is the lentil price. With the decreased lentil price, the research benefits
to Canadian producers decrease, ceteris paribus. In the case where Canada is a large exporter
of peas only, the lentil price is fixed and the IRRs are not affected by the variation of cross
knowledge elasticities. Thus it is appropriate to derive the following result:
Result 5.8. The larger is the substitution effect between the demand of peas and lentils, the
smaller are the research benefits to Canadian producers in the case where Canada is a large
country exporter for both peas and lentils.
5.6.3 Effects of Demand Elasticities on Canadian Producer IRR
Table 5.8 presents the sensitivity analysis for different values of the demand elasticities. The
demand elasticity of peas does not affect the IRR if Canada is a large exporter of peas only.
However, in the case of LOE (p&l), as the demand elasticity of peas or lentils increase in
absolute value, the IRR to Canadian producers increases. In other words, the flatter are the
demand curves for peas and lentils, the more research benefits can be captured by Canadian
producers. Thus it is appropriate to derive the following result:
Result 5.9. The demand elasticity of peas (lentils) does not impact the IRR to Canadian producers
in the case of LOE (p). However, in the case of LOE (p&l), the larger are the demand elasticities
of peas (lentils), the larger are the research benefits that are captured by Canadian producers.
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Table 5.8: Sensitivity Analysis for Selected Parameter Values: IRR to Canadian Producers
IRR
Parameters SOE LOE (p) LOE (p&l)
percentage
Cross Knowledge Elasticities
Base values × 0 80.09 94.35 90.60
Base values × 1/2 69.43 77.27 71.52
Base values 57.70 57.75 48.78
Base values × 3/2 44.14 32.15 10.54
Cross Demand Elasticities of Pulses
Base values × 0 – 57.75 51.32
Base values × 1/2 – 57.75 50.25
Base values – 57.75 48.78
Base values × 3/2 – 57.75 46.58
Demand Elasticities of Peas
Base values × 1/2 – 57.7 45.34
Base values – 57.7 48.78
Base values × 3/2 – 57.7 50.37
Base values ×∞ – 57.7 54.61
Demand Elasticities of Lentils
Base values × 1/2 – – 46.40
Base values – – 48.78
Base values × 3/2 – – 50.32
Base values ×∞ – – 57.75
Source: Developed by the author.
Note: When calculating the impact of cross knowledge elasticities on IRR, the other elasticities are
kept at the base values; similarly when calculating the impact of demand elasticities (both
cross and own elasticities) on IRR, cross knowledge elasticities are kept at their base values.
5.7 Re-examine the Horizon Problem
The analysis of the horizon problem in Chapter 3 was carried out under the assumption of a single-
product producer operating in a small open economy. A more realistic model is developed in this
chapter by relaxing the above two assumptions under the condition of a multi-product producer
facing downward sloping demand curves. How would the multi-product production impact the
horizon problem? How would the large-country assumption influence the horizon problem? To
answer these two questions, a sensitivity analysis regarding the effects of trade status and cross
knowledge elasticities on the horizon problem is conduced in this section.
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5.7.1 Effects of Trade Status on the Horizon Problem
The simulation results of the horizon problem for the case of small country and large country can
be seen in Figure 5.11. The change in Canadian producer surplus (∆PS) is the marginal benefits
of R&D to Canadian producers. This figure provides an intuition of the impact of trade status
on the marginal research benefits, the corresponding numerical values of the marginal benefits
can be seen in Table 5.9 as well.
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ΔPS of Canada Large Country 
Figure 5.11: Sensitivity Analysis of Trade Status on the Horizon Problem
Source: Developed by the author.
Table 5.9 shows the IRR earned by Canadian producers for different membership horizons
under the condition that Canada is a small-country exporter and a large-country exporter for both
peas and lentils. In both the small-country exporter and large-country exporter cases, there is no
obvious deviation of the horizon IRR to IRR (the IRR with T=50) until T<10. However, even
when T is smaller than ten years, the absolute value of horizon IRR is still very high, indicating
that the horizon problem is not an issue for underinvestment. Therefore, it is reasonable to derive
the following result:
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Result 5.10. The horizon problem is not affected by the trade status, i.e., under all trade scenar-
ios, the horizon problem does not have an adverse impact on the incentives for producer-funded
agricultural R&D.
Table 5.9: Effects of Trade Status on the Horizon Problem
IRR
Small-country Exporter Large-country Exporter (p&l)












Source: Developed by the author.
5.7.2 Effects of Cross Knowledge Elasticities on the Horizon Problem
The simulation results of the horizon problem for different values of cross knowledge elasticities
can be seen in Figure 5.12. This figure shows an intuition of the impact of cross knowledge
elasticities on the marginal research benefits, the corresponding numerical values of the marginal
benefits can be seen in Table 5.10 as well.
Table 5.10 shows the IRR earned by Canadian producers for different membership horizons
for different values of cross knowledge elasticities under the condition that Canada is a small-
country exporter and a large-country exporter for both peas and lentils. When the cross knowledge
elasticities are no larger in absolute value than the base values, there is no obvious deviation
of the horizon IRR to IRR until T<10 in both the small country and large country cases. Even
at T=10, the horizon IRRs are high, indicating that the horizon problem does not likely affect
farmers R&D investment decisions. When the cross knowledge elasticities are greater than the
base values, the horizon problem is not an issue in the small exporter case; but in the large
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Figure 5.12: Sensitivity Analysis of Cross Knowledge Elasticities on Canadian ∆PS (Large-
country Exporter)
Source: Developed by the author.
exporter case, the horizon IRR has negative values when T< 20. The numerical results indicate
that the impact of the horizon problem is not affected by the cross knowledge elasticities unless
they are greater than the base values in the large country case. Therefore, it is reasonable to
derive the following result:
Result 5.11. The impact of the horizon problem is not affected by cross knowledge elasticities
when their values are no greater than the base values.
5.8 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, a partial equilibrium model is developed for an open economy with seven regions
and four products to examine the worldwide impact on prices, output and economic welfare of
Canadian producer-funded R&D. The model captures the market connections within Canada,
the connections within the overseas importing countries, and between Canada and the importing
countries. The internal rate of return to Canadian producers for the pea R&D investment is
calculated and a sensitivity analysis is conducted with respect to the key parameters. Furthermore,
109
Decisions of Producer-Funded Agricultural Research and Development
the horizon problem is re-examined under the condition of multi-product producers in a large
country case.
The key results indicate that while consumers in all the regions are better off, overseas
producers are worse off. Although overseas pea production declines, total world pea production
increases as a consequence of the increased pea production in Canada. The concentration of pea
production in Canada makes importing countries more reliant on food imports, an outcome that
has the potential to raise food security issues in developing countries
An important contribution of this chapter is that the marginal returns to producer-funded
R&D are modelled under the condition of a pivotal supply shift when the levy is imposed and a
parallel supply shift when the R&D benefits are generate. This model fills a gap in the existing
literature which to date has assumed that the R&D costs and benefits are generated by the same
supply shift pattern (see, for example, Alston et al. [2004]). The results of this study indicate
that trade status does affect the incentives to undertake R&D.
The results that have been discussed above are obviously subject to a number of limitations.
First, the world is divided into seven regions and there is no heterogeneity within the importing
countries. Second, given the available information on the parameters such as the elasticity of the
knowledge stock, attention should be focused on direction of the change and the order of the
magnitude of the welfare effects rather than on their specific values. Third, the model does not
include the environmental benefits that accrue because the pea innovation in Canada induces a
substitution of fertilizer use.
The analysis in this chapter is based on the assumption of no spillovers among the four
crops. Further research needs to be carried out by relaxing this assumption. The analysis can
be extended to the case where producers of other crops can free-ride on the benefits generated
by R&D investment of pulse producers, and how this free-riding can affect R&D investment
decisions.
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Table 5.10: Effects of Cross Knowledge Elasticities on the Horizon Problem
IRR
Canada is Canada is
Parameters Time Horizon Small-country Exporter Large-country Exporter
Cross Knowledge Elasticities percentage




























Source: Developed by the author.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Conclusions
6.1 Summary and Conclusions
Agricultural R&D investment is becoming an increasingly important policy issue as food prices
push upwards and food security problems emerge [Alston et al., 2009a]. An important source
of agricultural R&D funding is from producer check-offs, which are increasingly being used to
fund applied agricultural research such as disease management, genetic improvement, and weed
control. Existing studies of producer-funded agricultural R&D indicate that there are high private
and social rates of return to agricultural R&D investment by farmers, and thus that farmers are
under investing in R&D.
There are a number of explanations as to why farmer organizations would underinvest in
R&D. These problems include the free-rider problem, the portfolio problem, the control problem,
the heterogeneity problem, and the horizon problem [Olson, 1971; Jensen and Meckling, 1979;
Cook, 1995; Alston and Fulton, 2012; Vitaliano, 1983]. These problems emerge because of the
individual incentives facing producers in a collective organization and because of the manner in
which decisions are made within the organization.
The objective of the thesis is to examine one of the factors – the horizon problem – behind
the apparent disincentive that exists for farmers to invest in producer-funded R&D investment.
To undertake this analysis, two models were developed. The first one consisted of a framework
for determining the marginal internal rate of return of investing in R&D, while the second one
consisted of a trade model that could be used to examine the impact of R&D funding by Canadian
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pulse growers. Pulses were chosen because they are an important crop for western Canadian grain
farmers and because Canada is a major exporter of pulses (Canada has over 50 percent of the
export market in peas and lentils).
The first model – the one focusing on the marginal internal rate of return – was used to
examine a particular issue that has been identified as a source of the underinvestment in R&D,
namely the horizon problem. Given the long period of time over which the benefits of R&D
investment occur, the increasing age of the farm population implies that the horizon problem
could be an important factor in the underinvestment. The argument is that a farmer’s planning
horizon is less than the length of the R&D benefits, with the result that the incentive to invest is
reduced.
The results of this thesis show that, contrary to what has been argued by some authors,
the horizon problem is not a severe disincentive for R&D investment, unless the time horizon
is very short. Since the membership horizon for the average Canadian producer is 15 to 20
years, the horizon problem is likely not an issue for Canadian producers. Furthermore, the
analysis assumes farmers only are concerned with profit maximization. However, farmer may
also consider other factors when making R&D investment decisions, such as future generations
of agricultural producers and environment issues. The results of this study show even under the
extreme assumption of profit maximization, the horizon problem is not expected to be an issue
for Canadian farmers, let alone in a more realistic model implemented by including factors other
than profit. The results of the horizon problem model also show that the impact of the horizon
problem is not affected by land tenure relationships.
The second model – the one focusing on production and trade relationships in the pulse
industry – was used to examine the economic impact of Canadian pea R&D investment on
producers and consumers in Canada and in the various countries around the world that produce
and consume pulses. To address the underinvestment issue, it is important to understand the
question of who benefits from the research that is undertaken, and who bears the cost. Given that
Canada is the largest pulse exporter in the world an increase in R&D investment can be expected
to have a significant impact on international trade and overseas producers and consumers.
113
Decisions of Producer-Funded Agricultural Research and Development
The simulation results from the second model illustrate that with increased pea R&D in-
vestment, the price of peas and lentils decreases. Canadian pea production increases while over-
seas pea production declines; overall, total world pea production increases. Lentil production
in Canada and importing countries declines. While Canadian producers and consumers in all
regions are better off as a result of the R&D investment, overseas producers are worse off.
The results of the sensitivity analysis, which extend the results of Alston et al. [2004], show
that a pivotal supply shift resulting from an increased levy, combined with a parallel supply curve
shift as a result of a greater knowledge stock, changes the incentives for producers to invest in
the LOE versus the SOE case. Thus, trade status does affect the incentives for R&D, although
not to the extent that the horizon problem has any impact.
The IRR to Canadian producers does depend critically on the magnitude of impact that pea
R&D has on the production of other crops (e.g., wheat and canola). The larger is this impact –
i.e., the more that wheat and canola production falls as a result of higher yields/lower costs of
pea production – the smaller is the IRR. The results also indicate that the elasticities of demand
for peas and lentils in the importing countries do not have an impact on the IRR in the case
where Canada is the large country exporter for peas only; however, they do have an impact on
the IRR in the case where Canada is a large exporter for both peas and lentils. As expected, the
more elastic is the demand, the higher is the IRR.
6.2 Implications for Further Study
This study contributes to the producer-funded R&D literature and the producer cooperatives
literature. However, there a number of areas that can be developed further.
One area for future study is to model the horizon problem for a risk averse farmer that
maximizes expected utility rather than for a risk neutral producer with a profit maximization
objective as was assumed in this thesis. As Just [1974] argued, risk is a critical factor influencing
farmers’ decisions on new technology adoption, which in turn affects their R&D investment
decisions. Recall that the Monte Carlo simulation in chapter 3 indicates that as the membership
horizon decreases the variance of the expected IRR increases. This increase in the variance is
likely to cause an additional disincentive for R&D investment for risk-averse producers.
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A second area for future research is to examine the impact of different institutional ar-
rangements such as the voting mechanism on producer-funded R&D investment decisions. The
horizon problem model in this thesis implicitly assumes that the voting mechanism is exoge-
nous. However, a study to empirically examine the efficiency of different voting systems could
provide important insights into questions such as: Is majority voting an effective mechanism
to generate sufficient collective research investment? What would be the optimal mechanism
design to generate sufficient R&D investment for producer organizations?
A third area for future study is to examine the determination of the check-off level under the
condition of heterogeneous IRRs to producers. Heterogeneous IRRs mean different producers
have different willingnesses to pay for R&D activities – i.e., different preferences for check-offs.
For instance, farmers with a larger IRR prefer a higher check-off ratio because they can capture
higher research benefits. Farmers with smaller IRR prefer a lower check-off ratio. Given these
heterogeneous preferences over the check-off ratio, the choice of the check-off ratio makes some
group members better off while imposing a cost on other group members. An investigation of
the conflicts that exist among group members is a worthwhile subject for further research.
A fourth area of future research is to quantify the spillovers among crops. One reason why
farmers might underinvest in R&D is that R&D funding decisions are made on a crop-by-
crop basis, but the benefits flow to other crops via spillovers. For instance, wheat growers can
benefit from the R&D activities conducted by pulse growers (pulses can fix nitrogen in the soil,
improve land quality, and increase wheat productivity). The spillovers across levy programs
are particularly important in Canada, where agricultural R&D activity has been organized on a
commodity-by-commodity basis. A study could be carried out to quantify the spillovers across
the various crops using the partial equilibrium trade model developed in chapter 4. Furthermore,
the economic returns for Canadian pulse producers can be re-calculated with the spillover issue
being addressed.
A fifth area of research is to incorporate the impact of foreign trade policy of importing
countries into the trade model to examine its impact on IRR to Canadian producers. The trade
model in this thesis assumes that trade policy is captured by the transportation cost τ . However,
the trade policies in importing countries are often more complicated – a good case in point is
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the policy of zero tolerance of GM products in the EU. Determining the impact of these trade
restrictions on Canadian pulse R&D investment decisions would provide a fuller understanding
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Appendix A
Technical Notes of Chapter 5
A.1 Demand and Supply Functions for Each Region
The responsiveness of the supply and demand to changes in prices is summarized in elasticities.
The own price elasticity of demand (supply) can be represented by ηj (j) and the cross price






























The structural model that we developed requires the specification of demand and supply functions
for the four crops, in each of the seven regions as well as the equilibrium conditions such as the
spatial equilibrium across regions for each crop. The demand function for one individual crop
in each country can be derived as the following with given values of elasticities1.
 Demand Functions of Canada
1For notation ease, elasticities used by the mathematical derivation represent the absolute value
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 Demand for Peas
Qdpc = apc + bpcPpc






























where Ppc, as mentioned before, is the net output price after check-off is paid, and the same
notation for prices in lentils, wheat, and canola supply functions of Canada.
 Demand for Lentils
Qdlc = alc + blcPlc






























 Demand for Wheat
Qdwc = awc + bwcPwc
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Under the assumption that Canadian producers face flat demand curve for wheat i.e., ηwc goes
to infinity.
 Demand for Canola
Qdcc = acc + bccPcc



















— Inverse Demand Function for Canola
Pcc = −acc
bcc
Under the assumption that Canadian producers face flat demand curve for canola, i.e., ηcc goes
to infinity.
 Demand Functions for India
 Peas
Qdpi = api + bpiPpi + bpliPli
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 Lentils
Qdli = ali + blpiPpi + bliPli






























(∵ bpli = blpi)
ali = Q
d
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 Demand Functions for China
 Peas
Qdph = aph + bphPph + bplhPlh
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Qdlh = alh + blphPph + blhPlh
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 Demand Functions for Bangladesh
 Peas
Qdpb = apb + bpbPpb + bplbPlb
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Qdlb = alb + blpbPpb + blbPlb
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 Demand Functions for Turkey
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 Peas
Qdpt = apt + bptPpt + bpltPlt
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Qdlt = alt + blptPpt + bltPlt
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 Demand Functions for the European Union
 Peas
Qdpe = ape + bpePpe + bplePle







































pe(1− ηpe − ηple)
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Qdle = ale + blpePpe + blePle






























(∵ bple = blpe)
ale = Q
d










le(1− ηle − ηlpe)










 Demand Functions for the ROW
 Peas
Qdpr = apr + bprPpr + bplrPlr







































pr(1− ηpr − ηplr)
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 Lentils
Qdlr = alr + blprPpr + blrPlr






























(∵ bplr = blpr)
alr = Q
d










lr(1− ηlr − ηlpr)











 Supply Functions of Canada
Based on equation (4.15), output supply functions in Canada can be derived as the following2:
 Peas
Qspc = (αpc + ρpcK¯pc) + βpcPpc(1− lp) + βplcPlc(1− ll) + βpwcPwc(1− lw) + βpccPcc(1− lc)
































































pc − βpcPpc(1− lp)− βplcPlc(1− ll)− βpwcPwc(1− lw)− βpccPcc(1− lc)− ρpcKpc















= Qspc(1− pc − plc − pwc − pcc − θpc)
2For notation ease, the subscript uses one letter to represent the crop when i = j. For example, βpc is used, rather
than βppc, to represent the own price elasticity of pea supply.
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where Qspc is the domestic production of peas in Canada, Ppc, Plc, Pwc and Pcc are the domestic
prices for peas, lentils, wheat and canola respectively, pc is the supply elasticity of peas, plc
is the cross supply elasticity of peas and lentils, pwc is the cross supply elasticity of peas and
wheat, pcc is the cross supply elasticity of peas and canola, α and β are parameters for intercept
and slope respectively.
— Inverse Supply Function for Peas







Qslc = (αlc + ρlpcK¯pc) + βlpcPpc(1− lp) + βlcPlc(1− ll) + βlwcPwc(1− lw) + βlccPcc(1− lc)

































































(∵ βplc = βlpc)
αlc = Q
s
lc − βlpcPpc(1− lp)− βlcPlc(1− ll)− βlwcPwc(1− lw)− βlccPcc(1− lc)− ρlpcK¯pc















= Qslc(1− lpc − lc − lwc − lcc − θlpc)
— Inverse Supply Function for Lentils
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Wheat
Qswc = (αwc + ρwpcK¯pc) + βpwcPpc(1− lp) + βlwcPlc(1− ll) + βwcPwc(1− lw) + βwccPcc(1− lc)



































































(∵ βlwc = βwlc)
αwc = Q
s
wc − βwpcPpc(1− lp)− βwlcPlc(1− ll)− βwcPwc(1− lw)− βwccPcc(1− lc)− ρwpcK¯pc












= Qswc(1− wpc − wlc − wc − wcc − θwpc)
— Inverse Supply Function for Wheat
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 Canola
Qscc = (αcc + ρcpcK¯pc) + βpccPpc(1− lp) + βlccPlc(1− ll) + βwccPwc(1− lw) + βccPcc(1− lc)







































































(∵ βwcc = βcwc)
αcc = Q
s
cc − βcpcPpc(1− lp)− βclcPlc(1− ll)− βcwcPwc(1− lw)− βccPcc − ρcpcKpc












= Qscc(1− cpc − clc − cwc − cc − θcpc)
— Inverse Supply Function for Canola







 Supply Functions of India
 Peas
Qspi = αpi + βpiPpi + βpliPli





























pi − βpiPpi − βpliPli
= Qspi − pi
Qspi
Ppi





= Qspi(1− pi − pli)
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Qsli = αli + βlpiPpi + βliPli






























(∵ βpli = βlpi)
αli = Q
s
li − βlpiPpi − βliPli









= Qsli(1− lpi − li)










 Supply Functions of China
 Peas
Qsph = αph + βphPph + βplhPlh





























ph − βphPph − βplhPlh
= Qsph − ph
Qsph
Pph





= Qsph(1− ph − plh)











Decisions of Producer-Funded Agricultural Research and Development
 Lentils
Qslh = αlh + βlphPph + βlhPlh






























(∵ βplh = βlph)
αlh = Q
s
lh − βlphPph − βlhPlh









= Qslh(1− lph − lh)










 Supply Functions of Bangladesh
 Peas
Qspb = αpb + βpbPpb + βplbPlb





























pb − βpbPpb − βplbPlb
= Qspb − pb
Qspb
Ppb





= Qspb(1− pb − plb)
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 Lentils
Qslb = αlb + βlpbPpb + βlbPlb






























(∵ βplb = βlpb)
αlb = Q
s
lb − βlpbPpb − βlbPlb









= Qslb(1− lpb − lb)










 Supply Functions of Turkey
 Peas
Qspt = αpt + βptPpt + βpltPlt





























pt − βptPpt − βpltPlt









= Qspt(1− pt − plt)
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 Lentils
Qslt = αlt + βlptPpt + βltPlt






























(∵ βplt = βlpt)
αlt = Q
s
lt − βlptPpt − βltPlt









= Qslt(1− lpt − lt)










 Supply Functions of the European Union
 Peas
Qspe = αpe + βpePpe + βplePle





























pe − βpePpe − βplePle









= Qspe(1− pe − ple)
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 Lentils
Qsle = αle + βlpePpe + βlePle






























(∵ βple = βlpe)
αle = Q
s
le − βlpePpe − βlePle









= Qsle(1− lpe − le)










 Supply Functions of the ROW
 Peas
Qspr = αpr + βprPpr + βplrPlr





























pr − βprPpr − βplrPlr









= Qspr(1− pr − plr)
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 Lentils
Qslr = αlr + βlprPpr + βlrPlr






























(∵ βplr = βlpr)
αlr = Q
s
lr − βlprPpr − βlrPlr









= Qslr(1− lpr − lr)
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A.2 Derivation of Indirect Utility Functions
If we observe a demand function that is homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income, satis-
fies Walras’ law, and have a symmetric and negative semidefinite substitution matrix, then to find
(indirect) utility functions that rationalize the above demand function is called the integrability
problem.
A.2.1 Importing Countries
Suppose there are three commodities: peas, lentils, and an aggregate of all other goods, in the
importing country s. Denote the price of the aggregate commodity Pgs as the numèraire price,
then the normalized price for good j is pjs = Pjs/Pgs (j = 1, 2 represent peas and lentils





gs = ms, where Q
d
js is the demand for commodity j in country s.
In the importing country, the market demand function for commodity j, i.e., Qdjs(p,m) can
be specified as follows:
Qdps = aps + bpspps + bplspls
Qdls = als + blspls + blpspps
(A.4)






⇒ bpls = blps
Let bpls = blps = bs, then equation (A.4) can be rewritten as
Qdps = aps + bpspps + bspls
Qdls = als + blspls + bspps
(A.5)
The negative semidefiniteness of the substitution matrix implies bps < 0, and bpsbls − b2s < 0
and bls < 0 as well. For notation ease, we will use the absolute value of the parameters and put
the negative sign in front, then equation (A.5) can be rewritten as
Qdps = aps − bpspps + bspls
Qdls = als − blspls + bspps
(A.6)
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Define the money metric indirect utility function as
µs(qs;ps,ms) = es(qs, vs(ps,ms)) (A.7)
That is, µs(qs;ps,ms) measures how much money one would need at prices qs to be as well
off as one would be facing prices ps and having income m. Therefore, µs(qs;ps,ms) behaves
like an expenditure function with respect to qs, and an indirect utility function with respect to ps
and ms, because it is a monotonic transformation of an indirect utility function (Varian [1992],
p110, p 158, 9.4).




= aps − bpspps + bspls
∂µs(qs;ps,ms)
∂pls
= als − blspls + bspps
(A.8)
The first equation implies





ps + bsppspls + Cps (A.9)
where Cps is a constant of integration. The second equation implies





ls + bsppspls + Cls (A.10)
Therefore, we must have the following form of the money metric indirect utility function










ls + Cs (A.11)
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Because µs(qs; qs,ms) = ms, then Cps and Cls can be solved as an expression with respect to













Therefore, the indirect utility function can be derived as











By using Roy’s Identity, the demand function for peas and lentils can be derived as what equation
(A.6) defined.
The direct utility function can be derived as
us(Qps, Qls, gs) = gs−bls(Qps − aps)
2 + bps(Qls − als)2
2(bpsbls − b2s)
+
bs(apsQls + alsQps −QpsQls − apsals)
bpsbls − b2s
(A.14)
This is the quasilinear utility function. Quasilinear utility function is defined as
Us(x0s, x1s, ..., xks) = x0s + us(x1s, ..., xks) (A.15)
Note that the utility function is linear in one of the goods, but (possibly) nonlinear in the other
goods (Varian [1992], p 164.). For the quasilinear utility function, the demand function is inde-
pendent of income (Varian [1992], p 166).
A.2.2 Canada
Suppose there are five commodities – peas, lentils, wheat, canola, and the aggregate of all other
commodities, in Canada. Denote the price of the aggregate commodities Pgc as the numèraire
price, then the normalized price for good j is pjc = Pjc/Pgc (j = 1,..., 4 represent peas, lentils,







gc = mc, where Q
d
jc is the demand for commodity j.
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In Canada, under the assumption of Pgc = 1, the market demand function for commodity j,
i.e., Qdjc(P c,mc) can be specified as:
Qdpc = apc − bpcPpc
Qdlc = alc − blcPlc
Qdwc = awc − bwcPwc
Qdcc = acc − bccPcc
(A.16)
Define the money metric indirect utility function as
µc(qc;pc,mc) = ec(qc, vc(P c,mc)) (A.17)
That is, µc(P c; qc,mc) measures how much money one would need at prices P c to be as well
off as one would be facing prices qc and having income m. Therefore, µc(P c; qc,mc) behaves
like an expenditure function with respect toP c, and an indirect utility function with respect to qc
and mc, because it is a monotonic transformation of an indirect utility function (Varian [1992],
p110).




= apc − bpcppc
∂µc(qc;pc,mc)
∂plc
= alc − blcplc
∂µc(qc;pc,mc)
∂pwc
= awc − bwcpwc
∂µc(qc;pc,mc)
∂pcc
= acc − bccpcc
(A.18)
The first equation implies





pc + Cpc (A.19)
where Cpc is a constant of integration.
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The second equation implies





lc + Clc (A.20)
The third equation implies





wc + Cwc (A.21)
The forth equation implies





cc + Ccc (A.22)























Because µc(qc; qc,mc) = mc, then Cpc, Clc, Cwc, and Ccc can be solved as an expression
with respect to qc, then plug Cpc, Clc, Cwc, and Ccc into equation (A.23) to get Cc. Using
µc(qc; qc,mc) = mc, we have
µc(qc;pc,mc) = mc + apc(qpc − ppc)− 12bpc(q2pc − p2pc) + alc(qlc − plc)− 12blc(q2lc − p2lc)
+awc(qwc − pwc)− 12bwc(q2wc − p2wc) + acc(qcc − pcc)− 12bcc(q2cc − p2cc)
(A.24)
Therefore, the indirect utility function can be derived as






















By using Roy’s Identity, the demand function for peas, lentils, wheat, and canola can be derived
as what equation (A.16) defined.
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A.3 Derivation of Consumer Surplus
A.3.1 Importing Countries
Suppose the consumer has a fixed wealth levelms > 0, then the welfare change can be measured
as of the difference of indirect utility function vs(p1s,ms)− vs(p0s,ms). However, utility theory
is purely ordinal in nature and there is no unambiguously right way to quantity utility change.
A notable measure of the welfare change that can be expressed in dollar unit is money metric
indirect utility function. Becauseµs(p0s;p
1
s,ms) measures how much income the consumer would
need at prices p0s to be as well off as he or she would be facing prices p
1
s and having income m.
That is, µs(p0s;p
1




s,ms)) (Varian [1992], p 161).
When the utility function is quasilinear, consumer surplus is an accurate measure for the
welfare change, furthermore, it is equal to both the compensating variation and the equivalent
variation (Varian [1992], p163). Moreover, for the quasilinear utility function, the integral of
demand is essentially the money metric utility function. Therefore, the consumer surplus that
is represented by the above utility difference can be calculated as follows by using the money




Set qs equal to p0s, then
∆CSs = µs(p0s;p
1
s,ms)− µs(p0s;p0s,ms) = µs(p0s;p1s,ms)−ms (A.27)
Plug equation (A.12) into (A.27) with replacing qs by p0s, we get











where pa·s is the equilibrium price after the R&D investment, p·s is the initial equilibrium price
before R&D.
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A.3.2 Canada
∆CSc = µc(p0c ;p
1
c ,mc)− µc(p0c ;p0c ,mc) = µc(p0c ;p1c ,mc)−mc (A.29)
Plug equation (A.24) into (A.29) with replacing q by p0, we get
⇒ ∆CSc = apc(ppc − papc)− 12bpc(p2pc − p2apc) + alc(plc − palc)− 12blc(p2lc − p2alc)
+awc(pwc − pawc)− 12bwc(p2wc − p2awc) + acc(pcc − pacc)− 12bcc(p2cc − p2acc)
(A.30)
Under the assumption that Pgc = 1 and that the prices for wheat and canola are fixed (Canada is
assumed to be a small country in the wheat and canola markets), equation (4.19) can be rewritten
as:









lc − P 2alc) (A.31)
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A.4 The Partial Equilibrium Trade Model
A.4.1 Partial Equilibrium Model before the Increase of Pea R&D Investment
Qdpc = apc + bpcPpc (A.32)
Qdpi = api + bpiPpi + bpliPli (A.33)
Qdph = aph + bphPph + bplhPlh (A.34)
Qdpb = apb + bpbPpb + bplbPlb (A.35)
Qdpt = apt + bptPpt + bpltPlt (A.36)
Qdpe = ape + bpePpe + bplePle (A.37)
Qdpr = apr + bprPpr + bplrPlr (A.38)
Qdlc = alc + blcPlc (A.39)
Qdli = ali + blpiPpi + bliPli (A.40)
Qdlh = alh + blphPph + blhPlh (A.41)
Qdlb = alb + blpbPpb + blbPlb (A.42)
Qdlt = alt + blptPpt + bltPlt (A.43)
Qdle = ale + blpePpe + blePle (A.44)
Qdlr = alr + blprPpr + blrPlr (A.45)
Pwc = −awc/bwc (A.46)
Pcc = −acc/bcc (A.47)
Qspc = (αpc + ρpcK¯pc) + βpcPpc(1− lp) + βplcPlc(1− ll) + βpwcPwc(1− lw) + βpccPcc(1− lc)(A.48
Qspi = αpi + βpiPpi + βpliPli (A.49)
Qsph = αph + βphPph + βplhPlh (A.50)
Qspb = αpb + βpbPpb + βplbPlb (A.51)
Qspt = αpt + βptPpt + βpltPlt (A.52)
Qspe = αpe + βpePpe + βplePle (A.53)
Qspr = αpr + βprPpr + βplrPlr (A.54)
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Qslc = (αlc + ρlpcK¯pc) + βplcPpc(1− lp) + βlcPlc(1− ll) + βlwcPwc(1− lw) + βlccPcc(1− lc)(A.55)
Qsli = αli + βlpiPpi + βliPli (A.56)
Qslh = αlh + βlphPph + βlhPlh (A.57)
Qslb = αlb + βlpbPpb + βlbPlb (A.58)
Qslt = αlt + βlptPpt + βltPlt (A.59)
Qsle = αle + βlpePpe + βlePle (A.60)
Qslr = αlr + βlprPpr + βlrPlr (A.61)
Qswc = (αwc + ρwpcK¯pc) + βpwcPpc(1− lp) + βlwcPlc(1− ll) + βwcPwc(1− lw) + βwccPcc(1− lc)(A.62
Qscc = (αcc + ρcpcK¯pc) + βpccPpc(1− lp) + βlccPlc(1− ll) + βwccPwc(1− lw) + βccPcc(1− lc)(A.63)
Ppi = Ppc +Gpi (A.64)
Pph = Ppc +Gph (A.65)
Ppb = Ppc +Gpb (A.66)
Ppt = Ppc +Gpt (A.67)
Ppe = Ppc +Gpe (A.68)
Ppr = Ppc +Gpr (A.69)
Pli = Plc +Gli (A.70)
Plh = Plc +Glh (A.71)
Plb = Plc +Glb (A.72)
Plt = Plc +Glt (A.73)
Ple = Plc +Gle (A.74)































































where equation (A.32) to (A.47) are demand functions for peas, lentils, wheat and canola in
Canada and all importing countries respectively. Equation (A.48) to (A.63) are supply functions
for peas, lentils, wheat, canola in Canada and importing countries respectively. Equation (A.64)
to (A.75) are the spatial price differentials for each region to Canada. Equation (A.78) is the
market clear condition for world pea market in which the total supply is equal to the total
demand. Equation (A.79) is the market clear condition for world lentil market.
A.4.2 Partial Equilibrium Model after the Increase of Pea R&D Investment
In the case of Canadian farmers increase R&D investment in peas in any given year, the knowledge
stock of peas in Canada will increase from , Kpc, in equation (A.48), to Kapc. Consequently,
Canadian pea supply function, i.e., equation (A.48) turns into
Qspc = (αpc + ρpcK¯apc) + βpcPpc(1− lap) + βplcPlc(1− ll) + βpwcPwc(1− lw) + βpccPcc(1− lc)
(A.80)
whereKapc = Kpc(1+10%) and lap is the check-off ratio after the increase of R&D investment.
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A.5 Proof of The Proportional R&D Benefits and Costs: Parallel Supply
Shift vs Pivotal Supply Shift
Alston et al. [2004] show that in the case of a parallel supply shift, producers have the same
incentive to invest in R&D if they are in a small open economy (SOE) or a large open economy
(LOE)). Alston et al. [2004] also analyze the case of a pivotal supply shift.
This thesis models a pivotal supply shift that generates the R&D cost and a parallel supply
shift that generates the R&D benefit; it also examines the effect of trade status (SOE versus LOE)
on farmers’ investment incentives in such a model. The pivotal supply shift in the case of R&D
cost is empirically important because percentage levies are used in the Canadian pulse industry.
Understanding how farmers’ investment incentives are influenced in this case may help to shed
light on the underinvestment in R&D.
Figure A.1 depicts the welfare effects of R&D investment for a single-product producers,
i.e., peas producers in Canada. The supply curve for Canadian peas prior to the introduction
of a checkoff is S0. In the case of per unit levy, as Alston et al. [2004] analyzed, the supply
curve parallel shifts from S0 to S ′1. In the case of percentage levy, as the model in this thesis, the
supply curve pivotal shifts from S0 to S1. Market clears at h before levy, and clears at e after the
levy. Assume all check-off revenue are invested into R&D activities. This thesis assumes that
the check-off ratio increases from lp to l′p only at t = 0, and returns to lp at the periods of t = 1
to t = 50, as Figure 5.1 shows. Under this assumption, at period t = 0, the supply curve shifts
from S0 to S1 in the case of pivotal shift, and shifts from S0 to S ′1 in the case of parallel shift.
Then at period t = 1, the supply curve shifts back to S0. This levy-funded R&D investment
results in higher productivity and causes a parallel shift of the supply curve from S0 to S2 from
period t = 1 to t = 50, and the market clears at k.
Parallel Supply Shift
Under the condition of parallel shift, in the case of small-country exporter, R&D cost is the
difference of the producer surplus before and after the levy, i.e., area abc − d′ec in Figure A.1,
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and the R&D benefit is the area fgc − abc. In the large country case, R&D cost is the area




fkj − ahi (A.81)
Pivotal Supply Shift
Under the condition of pivotal shift, in the case of small-country exporter, R&D cost is the
difference of the producer surplus before and after the levy, i.e., area abc − dec in Figure A.1,
and the R&D benefit is the area fgc − abc. In the large country case, R&D cost is the area
ahi− dec, and the R&D benefit is area fkj − ahi.
To examine whether farmers investment incentives change in the large country case versus




fkj − ahi (A.82)
Collecting terms, expression (A.82) can be transformed to
abc− d′ec+ d′ec− dec
fgc− abc T
ahi− d′ec+ d′ec− dec





fkj − ahi (A.84)
from equation (A.81). Therefore, to compare the LHS and RHS of equation (A.82) is equivalent




fkj − ahi (A.85)




fkj − ahi (A.86)
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fkj − ahi (A.87)
Equation (A.87) indicates that the IRR in the large country case is greater than the IRR in the

















    













Figure A.1: Welfare Effects: Parallel vs Pivotal Supply Shift
Source: Developed by the author.
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